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THE PROBLEMS AND GAPS IN THE NUCLEAR LIABILITY
CONVENTIONS AND AN ANALYSIS OF How AN ACTUAL CLAIM
WOULD BE BROUGHT UNDER THE CURRENT EXISTING TREATY
REGIME IN THE EVENT OF A NUCLEAR ACCIDENT
DUNCAN E. J. CURRIE 1

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This paper addresses the problems and gaps in the existing nuclear liability
conventions and conducts an analysis of how an actual claim would be brought
under the current existing treaty regime in the event of a nuclear accident.
The nuclear liability conventions have been described with some justification
as forming a very complex labyrinth. However since the Labyrinth was an
elaborate maze to hold the Minotaur, the description may mislead. In this case, it
could be said that the Minotaur largely constructed the labyrinth.
The international nuclear liability regime is extremely patchy, complicated
and features sparse participation. While the recent amendments to the Vienna and
Paris Conventions are much heralded, they are heavily hedged with exceptions and
the amended Protocols enjoy even more sparse participation than the original
Conventions. Others, such as the Convention on Supplementary Convention, are
not in force; and for those that are in force, many major nuclear countries are not
party to them. So discussion of Conventions must take into account their
membership.
Characteristics of the system include that no neutral tribunal is provided and
claimants are generally required to file claims in the courts where the nuclear
installation is located, even with respect to nuclear transports on the high seas, with
attendant costs, concerns about neutrality of the courts and law, and limitations of
recoverable damages. Liability is limited in time and in amount, amounting to a
subsidy of the nuclear industry; the definition of damage is narrow and likely to be
interpreted by the courts of the installation state; and the treaties that are there enjoy
very narrow participation.
The value of these features to victims of nuclear accidents and to non-nuclear
States is limited. While unlimited liability may lead to the ruin of the operator,
limited liability may lead to the ruin of the victim. Other arguments are that the

1. © 2005 Duncan E. J. Currie. Barrister of the High Court of New Zealand. Email
duncanc@globelaw.com. The author gratefully acknowledges the suggestions of Professor Jon van
Dyke. All errors are of course those of the author. All web references were as at Oct. 11, 2005 unless
otherwise noted.
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capacity of the insurance market is limited. Non-nuclear States and others may
question why they or the environment at large should be subjected to risks which
exceed the capacity of the insurance market. Similarly, with respect to the
limitation of time, the existence of radiation may not be known, consequences may
not be manifested until later generations, and even when they are manifested, the
causes may not be known or may be difficult to prove. Thus even a thirty year
time period may be too short for claimants, and ten years clearly would be too short
for claims for inter-generational injury.
Other barriers to justice exist, such as high legal costs, security for costs,
liability for costs of the opposing party, access to legal aid and standing
requirements, particularly to defend the environment, as opposed to property
interests. Groups acting in the general interest and to protect the environment
should have standing, as should groups representing fishing interest, farmers and
communities. The burden of proof and causation issues may place insurmountable
barriers on claims, as they have in past cases in the United Kingdom.
Three frequent concerns of non-nuclear States, being terrorist attacks,
environmental damage and pure economic loss, are all likely to fall within
exceptions. The 1997 Vienna Protocol introduces a poorly defined exception for
military installations. There are also some significant pitfalls in joining the
Conventions, in exposing Parties to low limits in other Conventions. The absence
of explicit provisions on standing raise questions on the ability of groups to act to
protect the environment.
The 1997 Vienna Protocol does explicitly extend the geographical coverage of
damage covered, covering damage 'wherever suffered', but leaves jurisdiction in
the Installation State; and while it extends the definition of damage, it leaves much
discretion to the laws of the Installation State. Economic loss arising from loss of
life, any personal injury or any loss of, or damage to, property is covered, but
economic loss other than that specified in the new definitions is only covered if
permitted by the law of the competent court, which will usually be the Installation
State. So economic loss to tourism and fisheries, for instance, which is not arising
from damage to property or personal injury as such, may well not be compensated.
So-called 'rumor damage', or economic loss caused by an incident without
necessarily being predicated on actual contamination, is no less real for the lack of
contamination.
The 1997 Vienna Protocol does introduce preventive measures, but if nuclear
damage has not yet occurred, these measures can only be taken where there is a
.grave and imminent threat'. Costs of reinstatement of the impaired environment
are covered, provided the impairment is significant and reinstatement measures are
actually taken. So where reinstatement is not possible, compensation may not be
forthcoming. The limitation of compensation to measures actually taken omits any
value of the impairment of the environment as such where reinstatement or
remediation is not possible, taking into account any impact on biodiversity and the
non-economic value of the environment including value to future generations.
Compensation for environmental impairment is limited to loss of income deriving
from an economic interest in any use or enjoyment of the environment, where the
environment was significantly impaired. The revised Convention extends the ten
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year time limit for claims to thirty years for loss of life and personal injury, as does
the 2004 Paris Protocol. On standing, the revised Vienna Convention does provide
that the State may bring an action on behalf of victims, but otherwise standing
provisions are extremely limited. Standing for groups to claim for economic loss
for environmental impairment would depend on whether they are entitled to claim,
leaving the matter to the lexfori.
The 2004 Paris Protocol has a more restricted geographical application, and
does not cover damage caused on the high seas or other areas beyond national
jurisdiction. It also does not include the Vienna Protocol residual definition of
economic loss. The Paris Protocol does allow a Party to subject passage through its
territory to increase the minimum amounts of liability.
A number of recommendations are made including criteria for a liability
regime where there is unlimited liability, a broad definition of recoverable damage,
absolute liability with few or no exceptions, all responsible parties bear joint and
several liability and a neutral tribunal for the adjudication of claims. Three damage
scenarios are postulated, to provide an opportunity to examine how the system may
work in practice.
II. INTRODUCTION TO THE LIABILITY TREATY SYSTEM

The Paris and Vienna Conventions have a number of features in common.
They both:
1. Limit liability to a certain amount and limit the period for making
claims
2. Require insurance or other surety by operators
3. Channel liability exclusively to the operator of the nuclear installation
4. Impose strict liability on the nuclear operator, regardless of fault, but
subject to exceptions. This is sometimes incorrectly referred to as absolute
liability.
5. Grant exclusive jurisdiction to the courts of one country, normally the
country in whose territory the incident occurs.
Of these, only the second and fourth offer significant benefits to victims of an
accident or incident, and even then, the strict liability is militated by various
exceptions.
The international liability regime is primarily contained in two sets of
instruments: the International Atomic Energy Agency's [IAEA] Vienna
Convention of 1963 which entered into force in 1977,2 and the OECD's Paris
Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy of 1960 which

2. Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, openedfor signature May 21, 1963,
1063 U.N.T.S. 26, available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1996/infSOO.shtml
[hereinafter
Vienna
Convention]
(Status
available
at
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/liability-status.pdf.
Status of Conventions
given in this paper are according to the latest information made available in the references cited).
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entered into force in 1968, 3 and which was bolstered by the Brussels
Supplementary Convention in 1963. The Brussels Convention 4 supplements the
very low liability levels starting with the Paris Convention of SDR 5 million, or C6
million, to SDR 175 million (about C210 million).5 Those levels were increased by
the 1982 Protocol to SDR 300 million.
Following the Chemobyl nuclear accident, the two main conventions were
linked by the 1988 Joint Protocol 6 which entered into force in 1992. However,
many important States have not ratified the Joint Protocol, including the United
Kingdom and France. Thus those countries are not linked by the treaty system to
Vienna Convention arties.
In 1997, the Vienna Protocol 7 and the Convention on Supplementary
Convention (CSC) 8 featured increased limits and introduced a somewhat broader,
but still limited, definition of nuclear damage to include preventive steps and
3. Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, openedfor signatureJuly
29, 1960, 956 U.N.T.S. 264, available at http://www.nea.fr/html/law/nlparis conv.htm [hereinafter
Paris Convention].
4. Convention of 31st Jan. 1963 Supplementary to the Paris Convention of 29 July 1960 on Third
Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, Jan. 31, 1963, 2 I.L.M. 685, available at
http://www.nea.fr/htmlaw/nlbrussels.html [hereinafter Brussels Supplementary Convention].
5. Id. at art. 3. (Parties to the Paris Conventions as of Aug. 31, 2005 were Belgium, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden,
Turkey and the United Kingdom. All Parties are also party to the 1964 Additional Protocol and 1982
Protocol. None are parties to the Vienna Convention, although Spain and the United Kingdom are
signatories. Slovenia withdrew from the Vienna Convention on Nov. 12, 2002. Parties to both the Paris
and Brussels Conventions are: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands,
Norway, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom. Paris only: Greece, Portugal, and Turkey).
6. Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for
Nuclear Damage and the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy,
opened for
signature
Sept.
21,
1988,
1672
U.N.T.S.
302,
available at
http://www.nea.fr/htmllaw/nljoint prot.html [hereinafter Joint Protocol] (Status is available at
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/jointprot~statuspd).
7. Protocol to Amend the 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, Sept.
12,
1997,
36
I.L.M.
1462,
available
at
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/protamend.htm [hereinafter Protocol]. (The
Protocol entered into force on Oct. 4, 2003, following the fifth ratification. According to IAEA
information provided at Aug. 31, 2005, there were five parties to the Protocol: Argentina, Belarus,
Latvia,
Morocco,
and
Romania.
Status
available
at
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/protamend-status.pdf).
8. Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, opened for signature
Sept.12,
1997,
36
I.L.M
1473,
available
at
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/supcomp.html [hereinafter CSC]. Pursuant to
Article XX, the Convention will enter into force on the ninetieth day following the date on which at least
five States with a minimum of 400,000 units of installed nuclear capacity have deposited an instrument
referred to in Article XVIII. After its entry into force, any State which has not signed the Convention may
accede to it. CSC, art. XX,
1, 2, openedfor signature Sept. 12, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 1482 - 83 available
at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/supcomp.html
(Status available at
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/supcomp-status.pdf. As of Aug. 31, only
Morocco, Romania and Argentina had ratified the CSC, Argentina being the last to ratify on Nov. 14,
2000. Signatories are Australia, the Czech Republic, Indonesia, Italy, Lebanon, Lithuania, Peru,
Philippines, Ukraine and the United States).
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environmental reinstatement 9 and made some other changes, such as allowing
compensation to residents of non-Contracting Parties. The minimum amount State
Parties must make available under national laws was increased to 300 million
SDRs (about £360 million),' and the CSC would provide for a supplementary
fund." The CSC defines additional amounts to be provided through contributions
by State Parties collectively on the basis of installed nuclear capacity and a UN rate
of assessment. Any State may adhere to the CSC, whether or not they are Parties to
any existing nuclear liability conventions or have nuclear installations on their
territories. The CSC has not yet entered into force and is nowhere near entering
into force.12
In 2004, a Protocol to amend the Paris Convention and a Protocol to amend
the 1963 Brussels Supplementary Convention were adopted, 13 bringing total
liability amounts, including State backup funding, to £1.5 billion. 14 However,
those Protocols are not yet in force.
15
The Vienna Convention has by far the widest participation, with 33 Parties
compared to the Paris Convention's 15 Parties. There are no States party to both,
but there are 25 Parties to the Joint Protocol. 16
The 1971 IMO Brussels Convention Relating to Civil Liability in the Field of
Maritime Carriage of Nuclear Material is specifically addressed to nuclear
transports 17 and exonerates a person otherwise liable for damage if the operator is

9. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. II.
10. Protocol, supra note 7, art. VII. Approximately E357,000,000. On Oct. 18, 2005, 1 SDR =
approx.
1.20 Euros or 1.45 USD.
International
Monetary Fund, available at
http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/fin/rates/rms-rep.cfm (last visited Oct. 18, 2005).
11. The fund is financed by nuclear generating States together with a small contribution from nonnuclear States. CSC article 4. CSC, supranote 8, art. VI.
12. The CSC requires five States with a minimum of 400,000 units of installed nuclear capacity to
ratify
or
accede.
CSC,
supra
note
8,
art.
XX
(Status
available
at
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/supcomp-status.pdf.
Current parties are
Argentina, Morocco and Romania).
13. Final Act of the Conference on the Revision of the Paris Convention and of the Brussels
Supplementary Convention, Feb.12, 2004, and see the accompanying Explanatory Report by the
Representatives of the Contracting Parties on the Revision of the Paris Convention and the Brussels
Supplementary Convention available at http://www.nea.fr/html/law/paris-convention.pdf (Status
availableat http://www.nea.fr/html/law/paris-convention-ratification.html).
14. Protocol to Amend the Convention of 31 January 1963 Supplementary to the Paris Convention of
29 July 1960 on Third Party Liability in the field of Nuclear Energy, as amended by the additional protocol
of 28 January 1964 and by the protocol of 17 November 1982, art. 3, Feb. 12, 2004, available at
http://www.nea.fr/html/law/brussels-supplementary-convention.pdf.
15. Vienna Convention, supra note 2 (Status as notified by the IAEA on Aug. 31, 2005. The last
change of status was May 20, 2005, when Russia ratified the Vienna Convention).
16. Joint Protocol, supra note 6.
17. Convention Relating to Civil Liability in the Field of Maritime Carriage of Nuclear Material,
Dec.
17,
1971,
974
U.N.T.S.
256,
available
at
http://www.admiraltylawguide.com/conven/carriagenuclear1971.html (The object of the Convention is
to channel liability to the operator of the nuclear installation. There are seventeen parties to this
convention: see http://www.imo.org/Conventions/mainframe.asp?topic id=247. See also the earlier
Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships, May 25, 1962, 57 AJIL 268.
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liable for such damage under either the Paris or Vienna Conventions, or by virtue of
a national law governing liability for the damage.
Convention Limitation Amounts
Convention Party

Operator Liability

Paris 1960

SDR 5 - 15
million

Paris 2004 and
Brussels (NIF)18

C 700 million

Brussels Supp.
1963
Vienna 1963

$ 5 million

Vienna 1997

SDR 150 million

State

E 500

E 300 million

SDR 175 million

SDR 300 million

SDR 300 million

CSC (NIF)

III. THE ESSENTIAL

Combined States

SDR 300 million

ELEMENTS OF A LIABILITY REGIME

An effective and comprehensive liability regime must contain the following
essential elements. The international liability regime can be measured against these
standards.
An international regime on liability and redress should be based on the
polluter pays principle, according to Principle 16 of the Rio Declaration.' 9 They
should provide means to prevent or 20remedy environmental damage and should
directly and fully compensate victims.

18. NIF = Not in force.
19. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, June 3 - 14, 1992, princ. 16, UN Doc.
A/CONF.151/26
(vol.
I)
(June
16,
31
ILM
874
(1992),
available at
http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/environmental.development.rio.declaration. 1992/doc
[hereinafter
Rio
Declaration]. Principle 16 of the Rio Declaration provides that "National authorities should endeavor to
promote the internalization of environmental costs and the use of economic instruments, taking into
account the approach that the polluter should, in principle, bear the cost of pollution, with due regard to
the public interest and without distorting international trade and investment." This was reiterated in the
2002 Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development. World Summit on
Sustainable Development, Aug. 26 - Sept. 4, 2002, Johannesburg, South Africa, Plan of
Implementation,
§§
15(b),
19(b)
(Sept.
10,
2002),
available
at
http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/WSSD-POIPD/English/WSSDPlanlmpl.pdf., §15(b) and
19(b).
20. Rio Declaration, supra note 19, at princ. 13.
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A. Absolute Liability Should Govern
Any exception shifts the burden onto the victim, and amounts to a subsidy to
the nuclear industry. 21 Terrorist attacks are a common concern, yet the
Conventions exclude acts of armed conflict, hostilities, civil war, and insurrection.
Where damage has recently been caused by extreme weather events, and where the
IPCC has warned that climate change can increase the intensity of
storms,22 exclusions of grave natural disasters of an exceptional character will be of
concern. Discussions in the International Law Commission on international
23
liability for transboundary harm arising out of hazardous activities are ongoing, 24
addressed
be
even
but disagreement between States on whether the topic should
means that progress is likely to be difficult.
B. Limitation Should be Unlimited in Amount
There are unfortunately no limits on damage that can be caused to nations, the
population, other industries or the environment. Many claimants would argue that
it is, therefore, logical that liability must be unlimited; and the polluter pays
principle would bear this out. The IAEA's Explanatory Text commented about
limited liability in noting that the Vienna Convention does not establish a
maximum liability amount and the Installation State is free to impose a higher
amount of liability, or unlimited liability, as follows: "In practice, few States have
opted for unlimited liability, which could easily lead to the ruin of the operator
without affording any substantial contribution to the compensation of the damage
caused. Indeed, even where the operator's liability is unlimited in amount,
insurance cover cannot be unlimited.' '25 While it may lead to the ruin of the
operator, limited liability may lead to the ruin of the victim. It may also encourage
the operator to take additional measures to avoid such ruin. The conclusion implies
that nuclear operators are not well capitalized; an argument against exclusive
liability. Limited liability assists the nuclear industry to obtain insurance cover;
sets relatively low limits, making that insurance cover cheaper; and channels

21. Id.
22. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [hereinafter IPCC], Third Assessment Report:
Climate Change 2001:,
Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability, para. 12.1.5.3, available at
http://www.grida.no/climate/ipccztar/wg2/468.htm, para. 12.1.5.3.
23. International Law Commission Proposed draft principles on International Liability for
injurious consequences arisingout of acts not prohibitedby internationallaw (Internationalliability in
case of loss from transboundary harm arising out of hazardous activities). U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/540
(March 15,) International Law Commission. Geneva 3 May-4 June and 5 July-6 August 2004) (written
available
at
Rao,
Special
Rapporteur),
by,
Pemmaraju
Sreenivaso
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/271/28/PDF/N0427128.pdfOpenElement.
24. International Law Commission, Report of the 55' Session, R 154 - 55 (2003), UN Doc.
A/58/1 0, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/reports/2003/2003report.htm.
25. IAEA, The 1997 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and the 1997

Convention on Supplementary Compensationfor NuclearDamage Explanatory Texts, at, note 230, page
at
GC(48)/INF/5
(Sept.
2,
2004),
available
12,
IAEA
Doc.
IAEA
[hereinafter
http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC48/Documents/gc48inf-5expltext.pdf
Explanatory Texts].
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liability to a single operator, thus relieving others in the nuclear industry, such as
suppliers of any liability.
Even if the later agreements were in force, and even if relevant Parties had
ratified the relevant agreements, the increased amounts are still nowhere near
amounts that could be incurred in the case of a nuclear incident. This means that
potential victims may not be fully compensated.
The cost of a serious nuclear accident can be immense, and many estimates of
damage vastly exceed the new limits. The total damage of a reactor meltdown in
Germany has been estimated to be over C5,000 billion.26 A 1994 Greenpeace
review of the costs of major nuclear accidents 27 has cited various estimates of costs
29
28
between USD 613 - 652 billion, 10.7 trillion (USD 6.8 trillion)(worst-case),
30
DM 4.5 - 83,250 billion, USD 21.34-695 billion, 31 and USD 67 million15.536 billion.32 The potential costs of an accident at sea have been estimated at
USD 7 billion.33 It can thus be seen that even the new limits in the 1997 Vienna
Protocol and 2005 Paris Protocol may well fall far short of actual damage suffered.
The potential shortfall is recognized in the revised Vienna Convention in that
priority in the distribution of the compensation shall be given to claims in respect
of loss of life or personal injury.34
The IAEA Explanatory text noted that "[t]he limitation of the amount of his
liability is clearly designed as an advantage for the operator, in order not to
discourage nuclear-related activities. 35 Not only does it not discourage them, it
acts as a subsidy. It has been estimated that means that nuclear operators enjoy
effective subsidies estimated at E20 billion a year for the EU-15.36 If a nuclear
operator were required to fully cover the potential cost of a nuclear accident, the
cost of operating a nuclear power plant would increase significantly. Studies have

26. H.J. Ewers and K. Rennings, Economics of Nuclear Risk - a German Study, in SOCIAL COST OF
ENERGY, PRESENT STATUS AND FUTURE TRENDS,

150, 157 (0. Homeyer and R. Ottinger eds., Springer-

Verlag, 1992).
27. Greenpeace International, Review of Estimates of the Costs of Major Nuclear Accidents,
prepared for the 9th Session of the Standing Committee on Nuclear Liability of the IAEA, Feb. 7-11,
1994.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Annex to the Protocol to Amend the 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear
Damage,
art.
VIII(2),
Sept.
12,
1997,
available
at
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/protamendannex.html.
35. IAEA Explanatory Texts, supra note 25, at 12.
36. Greenpeace International, Invest in a Clean Energy Future, 15 (July 2005) (written by Antony
Froggat
and
Sven
Teske),
available
at
http://www.greenpeace.org/raw/content/intemational/press/reports/SubsidiesReport.pdf. The actual value
of the subsidy depends on variables including the probabilistic risk of an off-site release of radiation, the
location of a plant and its proximity to urban populations and the local meteorological conditions.
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suggested that if no ceiling were in place, insurance premiums to French operator
EdF would increase the cost of generation by around 300%, or 5 cE/kSWh. 7
Limits can be increased by two-thirds majority of Parties under a new
procedure,38 taking into account the risk of damage resulting from a nuclear
incident, changes in the monetary values, and the capacity of the insurance
market. 39 Of course, non-nuclear States and others may question why they or the
environment at large should be subjected to risks which exceed the capacity of the
insurance market.
C. Just Time Limit ofLiability

Nuclear damage is insidious. The very existence of radiation may not be
known for some years. The consequences may not be manifested for generations.
When they are manifested, the causes may not be known or may be difficult to
prove. In many States, there is a thirty year time limitation period. The
Conventions, other than the revised Vienna Convention, shorten this time
limitation period considerably. Some damage may be latent and may take time to
develop or manifest itself, so it is essential that claims can be brought when the
damage is found, as well as when it is caused, and that there is a reasonable period
to bring a claim after the damage is found or caused. It is important that the time
should run from the time it becomes known or reasonably should have become
known by the claimant.
D. All Responsible PartiesShould Bear Liability
Channeling benefits the nuclear industry and its suppliers, as it focus liability
on one party who can then insure, but it prejudices the victim as it limits the parties
against whom they may claim. In the case of nuclear shipments, for instance,
liability should be borne both by the owner and operator of the vessel and the owner
of the radioactive cargo being transported, who is ultimately responsible for
creating the risk that has produced the damage.
Liability should be bome by the parties involved, who should bear joint and
several liability. The IAEA Explanatory Text said:
Like the principle of strict liability, the principle of exclusive liability of
the operator facilitates the bringing of claims on the part of the victims
of a nuclear incident, since it relieves them of the burden of proving the
liability of parties other than the operator. But the principle also
obviously favors the manufacturer, supplier or carrier of the material or
equipment, since it obviates the necessity for them to take out insurance,
as well as any other person who may have contributed to the nuclear
40
incident.

37. Id. Even being required to insure to €420 million would increase EdF's cost of generation by
8%, increasing insurance premiums from 0.0017 ce/kWH to 0.019 cE/kWH.
38. Protocol, supra note 7, art. V D. The decision is still subject to an additional confirmation of
acceptance by 2/3 of Parties: art. V D(4).
39. Id. at art. V D(3).
40. IAEA Explanatory Texts, supra note 25, at 11.
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Of course, nuclear victims may not be quite as relieved as the IAEA suggests
at having the number of liable parties and potential deep pockets slashed by the
Convention. In fact, if relieving parties of the burden of proving the liability of
operators is the only advantage, it is of little benefit since claimant lawyers can
easily choose whether or not they want to accept that burden.
E. Importance of a Backup Fund
There are a number of reasons that compensation for damage from
contamination or some other occurrence may not be forthcoming. If a liable party
cannot, or does not pay, or if the liability regime fails for some other reason,
compensation must still be paid and/or the reparation for damage to the
enviromnent made. Sometimes, for instance, even if a party is found liable, the
company is insufficiently capitalized and cannot or will not pay. A multinational
may set up a shell company so that the local company has limited liability with few
resources, for instance. Secondly, a company may claim an applicable exemption,
and so escapes liability. However, in such a case, the victim is still out of pocket.
Thirdly, damage may be caused to the environment, but not necessarily to any
private interest. In short, a properly structured and well capitalized fund can ensure
compensation and remediation regardless of fault, exceptions or the capitalization
of defendants.
F. Claimants should be Able to Bring Claims in a Neutral Tribunal
The Vienna Convention grants exclusive jurisdiction to the Installation State,
thus preventing victims from claiming in their own State. 41 This is true even where
an incident occurs during transport of nuclear material outside the Installation
State, such as an accident occurring to a coastal State. 42
Legal regimes that require claims be brought in the operator state place
impecunious claimants at an immense disadvantage. The problems that may face
victims in bringing a claim in the UK courts can be illustrated by the following
cases. In Merlin v. British Nuclear Fuels, PLC,43 where the court refused to grant
any damages to plaintiffs whose house had been contaminated by radionuclides,
even though the house lost almost half its value as a result of the contamination, on
the basis that the house was not 'physically' affected. 4 The owners decided to
move, as they did not want to expose their children to the health risk which they
believed would result from long term occupation of the house. 45 They sold the
house for a considerably reduced sum. 4 6 The High Court held that that the mere
presence within the plaintiffs' property of alpha emitting radionuclides emanating
from waste discharged, which caused no physical damage to the fabric of the

41. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. XI.I.
42. Id. at art. XI.2. The 1997 Protocol amends this for Parties to that Protocol.
43. Merlin v. British Nuclear Fuels,PLC, [1990] 3 All ER 711, 720 - 21, [1990] 3 WLR 383.
44. Id. at 720 -21. Section 7 of the Nuclear Installations Act 1965 requires operators to ensure that
to ensure that no occurrence involving nuclear matter, or ionizing radiations emitted from any waste
discharged from their site causes "damage to any property of any person" other than the defendants.
45. Id. at 717.
46 Id. at 717 - 18.
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47
property, could not on its own constitute damage under the 1965 Act. It appears
that a 'floodgates' argument may have influenced the Court, finding that "it is in the
nature of nuclear installations that there will be some additional radionuclides
present in the houses of the local population., 48 The Court also found that "the
presence of alpha emitting radionuclides in the human airways or digestive tracts or
even in the bloodstream merely increases the risk of cancer to which everyone is
exposed from both natural and artificial radioactive sources. They do not per se
amount to injury."4 9 These findings starkly illustrate the difficulties victims of a
nuclear accident outside the UK claiming in UK courts would face.
50
where
In the later Blue Circle Industries plc v Ministry of Defence case,
land was contaminated, damage was found to have occurred, but the Court of
Appeal explained the Merlin case by saying that the dust was in the house and the
Judge did not hold that the house and the radioactive material were so intermingled
as to mean that the characteristics of the house were altered. So in neither Merlin
nor Blue Circle were the courts willing to recognize that radioactive contamination

per se constitutes physical damage.
It is clear that victims need access to a tribunal that would be neutral and not
linked economically to the nuclear industry, and which is applying law and
procedure independent of the Installation State. This may be contrasted with the
IAEA's claim that "the principle of non discrimination and equal treatment of
victims is often considered to be one of the basic principles of the nuclear liability

regime. '""
While the Convention requires the national law be applied without
discrimination,5 2 the very application of the law of the nuclear operator, and the
requirement to go to the nuclear operator's State courts, may be seen as
discriminatory. The polluter pays principle and the duty to avoid damage to areas
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction 53 both require access to justice
47. Id.
48. Id.
at 720 - 21.
49. Id.
50. Blue Circle Industriespic vMinistry ofDefence [1998] 3 All ER 385, [1999] Ch 289, where the
plaintiffs' land was contaminated by radioactive material from an overflowing pond on the Atomic
Weapons Establishment land, the land was held to be physically damaged by the admixture with the
topsoil of radioactive material, which required the expenditure of money to remove. Section 7 of the
1965 Act includes some alteration in the physical characteristics of the property, in this case the
marshland, caused by radioactive properties which render it less useful or less valuable. He had no doubt
that there was such an alteration in this case: the plutonium intermingled with the soil in the marsh to such
an extent that it could not be separated from the soil by any practical process. The level of contamination
was such that the topsoil of the marsh had to be excavated and removed from the site because the level of
radioactivity exceeded that allowed by the regulations.
51. IAEA Explanatory Texts, supranote 25, at 16.
52. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. XIII.
53. See Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment,U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.48/14 (1972), reprintedin 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972). Principle 21 provides for responsibility
to ensure that activities do not cause damage to the environment of other states or areas beyond the limits
of national jurisdiction. See generally Louis Sohn, The Stockholm Declaration on the Human
Environment, 15 HARv. J. INT'L. L.423 (1973), and Michael Akehurst, International Liability for
Injurious Consequences Arising out of Acts not Prohibited by InternationalLaw, N.Y.J INT'L. L. 3
(1985). See also Rio Declaration, supra note 19, at princ. 2, and Restatement (Third) of Foreign
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administered impartially by States which do not have an economic interest to
protect.
If multiple cases are brought in different countries, forum non conveniens
arguments in common law countries may well result in primary jurisdiction being
found at the place where the damage was suffered. 54 In civil law countries,
jurisdiction is likely to stay where the case was first filed. 5
This decision may be made at the expense of obtaining greater damages in the
courts of a nuclear installation, but overall it is in the interests of States suffering
damage to ensure justice is obtained for the most cases possible at a reasonable
cost. Victims should not need to go to the courts of the operator causing the
damage for compensation; they should be entitled to have resort to their national
courts for protection. This is even more so when reinstatement of an impaired
environment 56 or preventive measures are claimed.
With respect to nuclear shipments, both the revised Paris Convention5 7 and
the revised Vienna Convention grant exclusive jurisdiction to the party in whose

Relations Law, Section 601 (1987). Philippe Sands in PrinciplesofInternationalEnvironmentalLaw I at
186 (1995) concludes that taken together Principle 21 and Principle 2 "establish the basic obligation
underlying environmental law and the source of its further elaboration in rules of greater specificity." For
consequences for States of the breach of obligations, see the International Law Commission,
Responsibilityof States for InternationallyWrongful Acts, G.A. Res. 56/83, U.N. GAOR,
56th
Sess.,
U.N.
Doc.
A/RES/56/83
(Jan.
18,
2002)
available
at
http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/State-responsibility/responsibilityfra.htrm. See Article 3 of the Convention
on Biological Diversity signed at Rio de Janeiro on June 5, 1992, entered into force Dec.29, 1993, 31
ILM (1992) availableat http://www.biodiv.org/doc/legal/cbd-en.pdf.
54. In England, the House of Lords in Spiliada Maritime Corporation v. Cansulex Ltd. [1987] 1
A.C.460 held that the defendant must show that there is another alternative forum, available and more
appropriate than the English forum, where the case will be more suitably tried in the interest of parties
and of the ends ofjustice. If this is shown, the court will grant a stay, unless the plaintiff can show that,
even though factors connect the case with the alternative forum, special circumstances exist to show that
substantial justice cannot be obtained there. However, see the ECJ ruling in Andrew Owusu v. Nugent
B. Jackson, Case C-281/02 holding that that theforum non conveniens doctrine was incompatible with
the United Kingdom's obligations under the Brussels Convention. See Ronald A. Brand, Balancing
Sovereignty and Party Autonomy in Private International Law: Regression at the European Court of
Justice (University of Pittsburgh School of Law, Working Paper Series # 25, 2005) available at
http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 1025&context-pittlwps. In the United States, under
Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 250 (1981), the courts see whether an adequate alternative forum
exists and is available, and then weigh public and private interest factors, such as the interests of the
parties, such as access to evidence, judicial comity and the interests of the forum State.
55. Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial
Matters
1968,
Article
21
on
lis
pendens
available
at
http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/brussels.jurisdiction.and.enforcement.of.judgments.in.civil.and.commercial.m
atters.convention. 1968/doc.html#137 [hereinafter Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction], and EC Council
Regulation No 44/2001, Regulation 27 of which requires the court other than the first seized court to
stay its proceedings until the jurisdiction of the first Court is established.
56. Revised Vienna Convention, art. 1(k). See also art. 1(m) and 1(n), which hold that the law of
the State where the damage is suffered shall determine who is entitled to take measures of reinstatement
and it is the competent authorities of the State where the measures were taken whose approval is required.
57. Revised Paris Convention, art. 13(b), which provides that coastal State must have notified the
Secretary-General of the EEZ.
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58
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) a nuclear incident has occurred. This does not
apply where the incident occurs outside the EEZ but the damage occurs within it,
and thus can only apply when the shipment transits the EEZ. In contrast, with
respect to non-nuclear damage, the HNS Convention, concluded the previous year,
allows for jurisdiction in any State Party, including for damage caused within an
EEZ.59 The Oil Pollution Liability Convention allows for exclusive jurisdiction in
a country suffering damage.6 °

G. Applicable Law should be that of the Claimant
As with jurisdiction, applicable law should normally be that of the place of
damage, provided that jurisdiction can be obtained over those who are liable. As
one commentator has noted, two reasons militate for the law of the place where the
61
nuclear transports:
damage was suffered to be applied in the case of international
First from the inherent risk of the transport of nuclear material, it is clear
that an incident can cause damage in distant countries. Any person
liable for the transport incident is and must be aware of that fact.
Secondly, most likely and most frequently, the place of damage will be
where the potential victim has his or her habitual residence, while the
place where the hypothetical incident occurs often will be quite
accidental and will depend only on the route of transport. Any potential
victim, however, relies and is justified to rely on the expectation that the
safety standards of his or her country are observed in order not to be
62

damaged.

English courts, for instance, are likely to apply the lex loci delicti,6 3 although that
may be displaced by significant factors linking the tort or delict to another
country.64 Even with an accident on the high seas, the English courts are likely to
apply English law to a UK flagged vessel.65 Similarly, French 66 and German67

58. Revised Vienna Convention, supranote 56, art. XI(lbis).
59. The Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection with the Carriage of
Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea, art. 38, 3(b), May 3, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1406 (1996) [hereinafter
HNS Convention].
60. International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for
Oil Pollution Damage, art. IX, Dec. 18, 1971, 11 I.L.M. 284, amended by 1992 IMO Protocol to Amend
The International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage 1969 [hereinafter Oil Pollution
Convention].
61. See Ulrich Magnus, Intercontinental Nuclear Transport from the Private International Law
Perspective, in Reform of Civil Nuclear Liability: Budapest Symposium, at 282 (1999).
62. See id.
63. See Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995, section 11, available at
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/actsl995/Ukpga.19950042 en l.htm, and Dicey and Morris, THE
CONFLICT OF CONFICTOF
LAWS
ed., 12
th e vl
vol. 2, 1993).
Lawenc Collins
Colinsed.
12ed.,
AWS 257
57 (Lawrence
64. Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995, section 12.
65. See The Esso Malaysia [1975] QB 198. See also Stuart Dutson, The Conflict of Laws and
Statutes: The InternationalOperationalof Legislation Dealing With Matters of Civil Law in the United
Kingdom and Australia,60 MOD. L. REv. 668, 687 - 88 (1997).
66. See Magnus, supra note 61, at 275, citing Cass. 25 May 1948 Rev. Crit. 1949.
67. See id. citing BundesgerichtshofBGHZ 57, 265 and BGHZ 119, 139.
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69
68
courts are likely to apply the lex loci delicti, as are Chinese, Indian, and Russian
70

courts.

Austria, on the other hand, has a choice of law rule for nuclear damage under
its 1999 Act. 7 1 The Lugano Convention 72 provides for jurisdiction where the
damage was suffered, where the dangerous activity was conducted, or where the
defendant has his habitual residence.
H There should a Broad Definition of Recoverable Damage
It is very important that the definition of damage is as broad and clear as
possible. Many jurisdictions do not allow for recovery of 'pure economic loss', or
loss which is not consequential on physical damage. An accident or incident
resulting in market loss caused by perception of contamination, for instance, which
may result in markets being closed due to no fault of the producer, is no less real to
those suffering the loss if there is no actual contamination that can be proven. An
effective international liability regime should cover property damage, economic
damage, damage to biodiversity, preventive measures, the cost of reinstatement and
reinstatement or remediation of an impaired environment.
Damages should include damages to the marine environment in areas beyond
national jurisdiction and damages resulting from perceptions of risk even if
damages or health effects are not measurable. Restricting the definition of damages
to damages that can be claimed in the operator's jurisdiction is indefensible. The
Merlin case 73 demonstrates the dangers for claimants of host State jurisdiction.
Even the expanded definitions of damages found in the 1997 Protocol do not
include damage to the marine environment and damages to tourism and the fishing
industry that may occur because of perceptions of risks by tourists and consumers
of fish regardless of actual damage caused. Damages should be defined broadly to
include all actual economic losses of all sorts and all losses to the marine
environment, as well as actual health damages and measurable property losses.

at
available
Law,
§146(1),
of
Civil
68. General
Principles
http://en.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=2696. Article 146 provides that the law of the place where
an infringing act is committed shall apply in handling compensation claims for any damage caused by the
act. If both parties are citizens of the same country or have established domicile in another country, the
law of their own country or the country of domicile may be applied. An act committed outside the
People's Republic of China shall not be treated as an infringing act if under the law of the People's
Republic of China it is not considered an infringing act. See also Magnus, note 61, at 280.
69. See Magnus, supra note 61, at 280, citing Paras Diwan, Private International Law (3 r ed.),
552ss, 570.
70. See id. at 281, citing Article 167 of the Basic Principles of Civil Legislation of the Russian
Union of May 31, 1991.
71. The Law on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Fission for Energy Generation in Austria:
Bundesgesetz tiber die zivilrechtliche Haftung fiir Schaden dutch Radioaktivitiit (Atomhaftungsgesetz
1999 - AtomHG 1999, BGB 1.1 No.
170/1998), § 23 permits claimants to opt for Austrian law for damage caused in Austria.
72. Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the
Environment, art. 19, June 21, 1993, not in force, 32 I.L.M. 1228 - 33.
73. See discussion supra p. 94.
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I. Just Standing and Access to Justice
An instrument should, therefore, have broad provisions on standing. Groups
acting in the general interest and to protect the environment should have standing,
as should groups representing fishing interest, farmers and communities. Also, the
wider issue of access to justice is not limited to the narrow question of standing
where legal costs can be a vital consideration. This applies to small farmers or
fishing groups as well as organizations. Some legal systems can require security of
costs, for instance, which can be a barrier. Many other legal systems dissuade
claims by having costs borne by the losing party; others provide for legal assistance
to bring environmental claims. Standing should not only be granted to those
affected by the damage, but also to those acting in the general interest. Groups
should have the right to protect environmental and social interests, which may be
wider than direct economic interest. Damage may be caused to the environment
and society without necessarily damaging private economic interests as such. This
includes so-called 'rumor damage' which may be caused by an incident which does
not release radioactivity, but which still causes considerable economic loss due to
lost market confidence directly attributable to the incident. 74
In addition, while capacity building to develop national regimes and
harmonization of laws are both important, many developing States would not have
the resources and capacity to lodge and pursue major claims in nuclear States.
Legal aid from a fund could be part of a solution, but an independent tribunal is
essential. Claimants should not be required to participate in the legal systems of
nuclear States to have claims resolved.
J Just Rules on Burden of Proofand Causation
Rules for liability for dangerous activities in place with other regimes
frequently require strict liability and shift the burden of proof. In the absence of a
regime, they allow unlimited liability and allow plaintiffs to file claims against
multiple defendants.
Proof of damage and issues of causation can put an unfair or even
insurmountable burden on victims. Slow-moving negative impact, in addition, may
be difficult to trace and to attribute. The relevance and importance of the
precautionary principle is also important in the context of shifting the burden of
proof of damage to nuclear operators and in the context of proving causation.
The problems of proving causality under English law were seen in Hope v
BNFL,75 where the court refused to recognize a causal link between the radio
nuclides released from the Sellafield nuclear facility and the increased cancers in
the surrounding area.
Some eight years later, research published in the
International Journal of Cancer in 2002 found that children of men exposed to
radiation while working at Sellafield have twice the normal risk of developing
certain types of cancer such as leukemia and non-Hodgkins lymphoma.76 The

74. See discussion supra p. 91.
75. Hope v. BNFL and Reay v. BNFL (1994) 5 Med. LR 1
76. Heather 0. Dickinson & Louise Parker, Leukemia And Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma In Children
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theory of a link between radiation dose and cancers among the fathers' children
was first postulated in 1990.77
These causation difficulties obviously have implications for limitation
periods: if research takes 10 years to prove a link between radioactive emissions
and an intergenerational effect, then a 30 year limitation period, let alone 10 year
period, is clearly too short for claimants. A victim of radiation may well take ten
years to conceive and the child may not manifest symptoms for another ten years.
IV. MEMBERSHIP OF THE CONVENTIONS AND OUTLOOK FOR NUCLEAR POWER

A critical issue for the international liability system is the membership of the
Conventions. There are currently 440 nuclear power stations operating in 31
countries.
However, many nuclear countries, including Canada, the United
States, Japan, India and China are not party to any of the liability Conventions.
Other major nuclear States such as the United Kingdom and France are party only
to the Paris Convention, whereas others, such as Russia which recently ratified, are
party only to the Vienna Convention. As noted earlier, many of these are not party
to the Joint Protocol, which links the Conventions for States party to the Joint
Protocol.
Developing countries account for 60% of the new reactors under
construction.79 In 2004, five new plants were connected to the grid in China,
Japan, Russia and the Ukraine. Of those, only the Ukraine is party to the Joint
Protocol. One laid up plant was reconnected in Canada, which is not a Party to any
of the Conventions, and construction began on a fast breeder reactor in India 80 and
a pressurized water reactor in Japan, 8' both of which are likewise outside the
system. Finland, which is in the Paris Convention system and which has ratified
the Joint Protocol, has begun work on a new reactor. The IAEA has estimated that
in 2020 there will be the equivalent of 127 more 1000 MW nuclear plants than in
2000.82 Belgium, Germany, and Sweden, all Paris Convention countries, are
planning to phase out nuclear power. Austria and Ireland, which are party to any
Convention, and Denmark, a Paris Convention country, all have policies against

Of Male Sellafield Radiation Workers, 99 INT'L J. OF CANCER 437, 437 - 44, May 2002, available at
http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fultext/9201326l1PDFSTART.
See also, Sellafield
Increases Cancer Risk, BBC, June 19, 2002, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/2054694.stm.
The researchers compared the records of 9,859 children fathered by men exposed to radiation at Sellafield
with those of 256,851 children born to other fathers in Cumbria between 1950 and 1991. Throughout the
whole of Cumbria, they found that the incidence of leukemia and non-Hodgkin's lymphoma was twice as
high among the Sellafield children.
77. Martin Gardner, Results of Case-control Study of Leukaemia and Lymphoma Among Young
People near Sellafield NuclearPlant in West Cumbria, BRITISH MED. J. (1990).
78. International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], Annual reportfor 2004, IAEA, at 1, GC(49)/5
(2005), available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Reports/Anrep2004/anrep2004_full.pdf.
Twentysix more were under construction at the end of 2004, eighteen of them being in Asia.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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in nuclear capacity over the last decade has
nuclear power.83 Most of the increase
84
come from plant life extensions.
The International Energy Agency (IEA) 85 has forecast that three-quarters of
existing capacity in OECD Europe will be retired by 2030, because reactors will
have reached the end of their life or because governments will have adopted
policies to phase out nuclear power. The IEA expects world nuclear capacity to
increase slightly until 2030, but the share of nuclear power in total electricity
generation to decline. 86 Nuclear power generation is expected to increase in Asia,
particularly China, South Korea, Japan and India. 87 None of these are party to any
liability Convention. There are many obstacles to development of any nuclear
power station, including financial, environmental, waste, fuel, health, safety,
security, proliferation and political issues to name a few, but these developments
should frame a discussion of international liability issue.
The membership of nuclear liability Conventions is, therefore, likely to be a
critical issue if nuclear power continues to develop as the IAEA and IEA project
since the new plants are projected to be built in countries which are not members of
the Conventions. In addition, the proliferation of liability Conventions and the
many combinations of treaty relations that are possible between States, together
with differing national legislation, means that precise liability for the many
different kinds of nuclear incidents and their geographical permutations is virtually
impossible to ascertain.
V. AN EXAMINATION OF THE VIENNA AND PARIS CONVENTIONS

A. The 1963 Vienna Convention
The 1963 Vienna Convention generally followed the 1960 Paris Convention.
Unlike the 1960 Paris Convention, it does not limit itself to damage caused in the
territory of States Party. It defines nuclear damage as loss of life, any personal
injury or any loss of, or damage to, property arising from a nuclear incident,88 and
any other loss or damage so arising or resulting if and to the extent that the law of
the competent court so provides.89 The operator of a nuclear installation is liable
for nuclear damage upon proof that the damage has been caused by a nuclear
incident. 9

83. Id. at 2.
84. See generally Uranium Information Centre, Plansfor New Reactors Worldwide, (Aug. 2006)
available at http://www.uic.com.au/nipl9.htm (chronicling plant life extensions in the United States,
United Kingdom and Russia) (last visited Oct. 17, 2006).
85. International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2004, at 34 available at
http://www.iea.org/Textbase/npsum/WEO2004SUM.pdf (last visited Oct. 17,2006).

86. Id.
87. Id.
88. 'Nuclear incident' is defined to mean "any occurrence or series of occurrences having the same
origin which causes nuclear damage." Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. I(l)(l).
89. Id. at art. I(l)(k).
90. Id. at art. II(1).
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Liability is strict, 91 but there is an exemption for nuclear damage caused by an
act of armed conflict, hostilities, civil war or insurrection, and, subject to the law of
the Installation State, damage caused by a grave natural disaster of an exceptional
character. 92 Insurance or other financial security is required to the specified limit,
94
which was as little as USD 5,000,000 in 196393 for any one nuclear incident.
B. 1997 Vienna Protocol
The 1997 Protocol entered into force in 2003, but its only Parties to date are
Argentina, Belarus, Latvia, Morocco, and Romania. 95 The 1997 Protocol contains
increased limits to either 300 million SDRs (about £360 million), 96 or from 5
million (about E6 million) 97 to 150 million SDRs (180 million) where public
funds shall be made available by a State to compensate nuclear damage up to at
least 300 million SDRs. 9' A transitional period is permitted for 100 million SDRs
(£1.20 million) for up to 15 years from the date of entry into force of the
Protocol, 99 potentially reducing the available compensation by two-thirds. The
paragraph also permits an operator to carry no liability insurance at all, as long as
the 100 million SDR is underwritten by public funds. 00 There is no qualification
on this opt-out clause. This is a significant potential subsidy for operators.
The Protocol broadens the definition of nuclear damage and extends the period
during which claims may be brought for loss of life and personal injury. It also
provides for jurisdiction of coastal states over actions incurring nuclear damage
during transport if they occurred within the EEZ. 0'
Whether a person is entitled to a claim would most likely be determined by
the governing law applied by the courts of the Installation State after applying their
conflict of law rules and is likely to be the lex fori since the revised Vienna
Convention subjects the categories of damage under article I(1)(k) to the law of the
competent court, which is defined in paragraph (e) as the law of the court having
jurisdiction under the Convention, including any rules of such law relating to
conflict of laws.' 02 The category 'any other economic loss, other than any caused
by the impairment of the environment' is expressly allowed only if "permitted by
91. Id. at at. IV(l) which uses the term 'absolute.'
92. Id. at art. IV(3).
93. The United States dollar used is a unit of account equivalent to the value of the United States
dollar in terms of gold on Apr. 29, 1963, "[T]hat isto say US $35 per one troy ounce of fine gold." Id. at
art. V(3). The current price of gold is about $596/oz as of October 17, 2006.
94. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. V(1). These amounts are exclusive of interest and costs.
Id. atart. V(2).
95. Protocol, supra note 7.
96. Id. at art. 7(1). These amounts are exclusive of interest and costs. Id. at art. 7(2).
97. Id. at art. 7(1). This lower amount may be established having regard to the nature of the nuclear
installation or the nuclear substances involved and to the likely consequences of an incident originating
therefrom. Id.
98. Id. at art. 7(5).
99. Id. at art. 7(6).
100. Id.
101. Revised Vienna Convention, supra note 56, art. XI.
102. Id. at art. I(l)(k).
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the general law on civil liability of the competent court". This appears to intend a
direct reference to the lexfori, without application of the conflict laws of the forum,
103
and clearly subjects economic loss to the law to the Installation State.
A potential pitfall for Parties to the Protocol is in article 19 of the Protocol,
which provides:
A State which is a Party to this Protocol but not a Party to the 1963
Vienna Convention shall be bound by the provisions of that Convention
as amended by this Protocol in relation to other States Parties hereto,
and failing an expression of a different intention by that State at the time
of deposit of an instrument referred to in Article 20 shall be bound by
the provisions of the 1963 Vienna Convention in relation to States
which are only Parties thereto.
Nothing in this Protocol shall affect the obligations of a State which is a Party
both to the 1963 Vienna Convention and to this Protocol with respect to a State
104
which is a Party to the 1963 Vienna Convention but not a Party to this Protocol.
In other words, Parties which join the Protocol but not the Convention are
bound by the lower limits in the Vienna Convention unless they state otherwise at
the outset, but Parties which join the Convention but not the Protocol are not bound
by the higher limits of the Protocol in any event.
To date, this provision could only apply to Morocco, as other Parties to the
Protocol are also Party to the 1963 Convention. Parties considering joining the
1997 Protocol would be well advised to opt out of the 1963 Convention, since they
would find the liability of 1963 Convention State operators limited to the much
lower provisions of the earlier Convention, as well as by the more restrictive
provisions. 10 5 However, this must be done at the time of ratification or
accession. 106
There is a new dispute resolution provision, 07 which provides for binding
108
determination by arbitration or the International Court of Justice.
C. The ParisConvention
The Paris Convention covered damage to or loss of life of any person or of
any property 0 9 "caused by a nuclear incident in such installation or involving
nuclear substances coming from such installation" 0 or "caused by a nuclear
incident outside that installation and involving nuclear substances in the course of
103. See id. at art. I.
104. Protocol, supra note 7, art. 19.
105. States already Party to the 1963 Convention would need to denounce that Convention under
article XXV, which requires twelve months' notice of intended termination before the end of the rolling
five year periods under that article. Vienna Convention, supranote 2, art. XXV(I).
106. Protocol, supra note 7, art. 19.
107. Revised Vienna Convention, supra note 56, art. XX A.
108. However, Parties can opt out. Id. at art. XX A(3).
109. Except the nuclear installation itself and property on the site. Paris Convention, supra note 3,
art. 3(a).
110. Id. at art. 3.
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2
carriage. '' I. Claims may only be made against an operator or its insurer.'1
3
Maximum liability is from 5-15 million SDR" (about E6 million - £18 million).
Actions must be brought within ten years.114 There is an exception for damage
caused by a nuclear incident directly due to an act of armed conflict, hostilities,
civil war, insurrection or a grave natural disaster of an exceptional character." '
Operators must carry insurance or security to the maximum amount. "1 6 Jurisdiction
lies with the courts of the Contracting Party in whose territory the nuclear incident
occurred 1 7 or in whose territory the nuclear installation of the operator liable is
situated. 1 8 Judgments are enforceable in Convention countries." 9

D. The 2004 Protocol
The Paris Convention was revised in 2004120 to increase limits and broaden
the definition of damage. The 2004 Protocol would increase the minimum liability
to €700 million,' 2' although the Installation State could reduce that amount to £70
million for installations, "having regard to the nature of the nuclear installation
involved and to the likely consequences of a nuclear incident originating therefrom,
or E80 million for the carriage of nuclear substances, "having regard to the nature
of the nuclear substances involved and to the likely consequences of a nuclear
incident originating therefrom."'' 22 A Contracting Party may subject the transit of
nuclear substances through its territory to the condition that the maximum amount
of liability of the foreign operator concerned be increased if it considers that such
amount does not adequately cover the risks of a nuclear incident in the course of the
transit, provided that the maximum amount thus increased shall not exceed the
maximum amount of liability of operators of nuclear installations situated in its
territory12 3 except where, under international law, there is a right of entry in cases
of urgent distress into the ports of such Contracting Party or a right of innocent

111. Id. at art. 4(b).
112. Id. at art. 4.
113. Id. at art. 7(b).
114. Id. at art. 8(a).
115. With respect to the last exception, except in so far as the legislation of the Contracting Party in
whose territory his nuclear installation is situated may provide to the contrary. Id. at art. 9.
116. Id. at art. 10(a).
117. Id. at art. 13(a).
118. Id. at art. 13(b).
119. Id. at art. 13(d).
120. Protocol to Amend the Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy of 29
July 1960, as Amended by the Additional Protocol of 28 January 1964 and by the Protocol of 16
November 1982, Feb. 12, 2004, 2004 O.J. (L 97) 55, available at http://europa.eu.int/eurlex/pri/en/oj/dat/2004/l_097/l_09720040401 en00550062.pdf [hereinafter 2004 Protocol].
121. Id.at art. H, amending Paris Convention art. 7. Costs and interest are exempted under Paris
Convention, supra note 3, at 7(h).
122. Id. at art. 7(b).
123. Id. at art. 7(e).
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is limited to transit through territory
passage through its territory. 124 This provision 25
1
and would not apply to passage through EEZs.
E. The Brussels Supplementary Convention
The Brussels Supplementary Convention 126 supplemented the liability
amounts under the Paris Convention of 15 million SDR (about E18 million) by
requiring contributions by the Installation State up to SDR 175 million and other
Parties to the Convention collectively on the basis of their installed nuclear
127
The revised
capacity to up to a total of 300 million SDRs (about C 357 million).
128
increased the State contribution to
2004 Brussels Supplementary Convention
E500 and the top tier to E300 million from public funds provided by all Contracting
compensation
Parties. The two revised Conventions, combined, bring total
29
available under the revised Paris- Brussels regime to E1.5 billion. 1
F. The Joint Protocol
The Joint Protocol is in force, but of major nuclear states only Finland,
Germany, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Sweden and Ukraine are party to it. 3 0 The
United Kingdom and France are not.
The essence of the Joint Protocol is that the operator of a nuclear installation
situated in the territory of a Party to the Vienna Convention shall be liable in
accordance with that Convention for nuclear damage suffered in the territory of a
Party to both the Paris Convention and the Joint Protocol, and vice versa for the
Paris and Vienna Conventions.131 In the case of a nuclear incident occurring in a
nuclear installation, the applicable Convention is that to which the State is a Party
within whose territory that installation is situated. Otherwise, in the case of a
nuclear incident involving the transport of nuclear material, the applicable
Convention is that to which the State is a Party32within whose territory the nuclear
installation is situated whose operator is liable. 1

124. Id. at art. 7(f)(i). A similar exception applies to carriage by air where there is a right to overfly
or land on the territory concerned at art. 7(f)(ii).
125. Ben McRae, The Compensation Convention: Path to a GlobalRegime for Dealing with Legal
Liabilityand Compensationfor Nuclear Damage, 61 NUCLEAR LAW BULLETIN 25, 33 (1998).
126. Brussels Supplementary Convention, supranote 4, art. 3(b).
127. Paris Convention, supra note 3, art. 3(b). Interest and costs can be ordered above these
amounts. Id. at art. 3(f).
128. Protocol To Amend the Convention of 31 January 1963 Supplementary to the Paris Convention
of 29 July 1960 on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, as Amended by the Additional
Protocol of 28 January 1964 and by the Protocol of 16 November 1982, available at
[hereinafter 2004 Brussels
http://www.oecdnea.org/html/law/brussels-supplementary-convention.pdf
Supplementary Protocol].
129. Id. at art. 3.
130. Id.
131. Joint Protocol, supra note 6, art. II.
132. Id. at art. III. Pursuant to either Article II(l)(b) and (c) of the Vienna Convention or Article
4(a) and (b) of the Paris Convention.
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This means that the Brussels Supplementary Convention is inapplicable where
the Joint Protocol applies, since the Joint Protocol will operate to make the Vienna
Convention applicable if the liable operator is a Vienna Convention operator.
G. The 1997 Supplementary Convention (CSC)
The Convention on Supplementary Convention, which is not in force, would
(about
increase the limitation amounts under either Convention to 300 million SDR
134
33
E357 million), 1 supplemented by public funds according to a formula.
It is only open to States party to the Vienna Convention or the Paris
Convention, or to a State which declares that its national law complies with the
provisions of the Annex to the CSC. 13 5 That Annex requires for instance that no
liability shall attach to an operator for nuclear damage caused by a nuclear incident
directly due to an act of armed conflict, hostilities, civil war or insurrection, or136
for a grave natural disaster of an exceptional character.1 37 It also has provisions to
allow the United States to join. 138
The CSC predicates its application 139 to Contracting Parties and their territory,
maritime zones, EEZs (but only in connection with the exploitation or the
exploration of the natural resources of EEZ or continental shelf), and nationals and
ships.
Jurisdiction except for incidents within EEZs 140 lies only with the courts of the
Contracting Party within which the nuclear incident occurs. 141 But where it is not
clear where the incident occurred, or where it occurs outside the territory of any
Contracting Party, rather than lying with the State where the damage was suffered,
jurisdiction lies only with the courts of the Installation State. 142 The applicable law

133. CSC, supra note 8, art. II. An Installation State may specify a greater amount. Id. at art.
1l1(1)(a)(i).
134. Id. at art. IV(1). The amount is calculated according to the installed nuclear capacity of the
Installation State and the United Nations rate of assessment.

135. Id. at art. XVIII.
136. CSC
Annex
art.
3(5)(a)
available
at
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/supcomp.html#Annex (last visited Oct. 21,
2006).
137. Id. at art. 3(5)(b), except if the law of the Installation State may provide to the contrary.
138. Id. at art. 2(1) provides that the national law of a Contracting Party is deemed to be in
conformity with the provisions of Articles 3, 4, 5 and 7 if it contained on Jan. 1, 1995 and continues to
contain provisions that provide for strict liability in the event of a nuclear incident where there is
substantial nuclear damage off the site of the nuclear installation where the incident occurs, require the
indemnification of any person other than the operator liable for nuclear damage to the extent that person
is legally liable to provide compensation; and ensure the availability of at least 1000 million SDRs in
respect of a civil nuclear power plant and at least 300 million SDRs in respect of other civil nuclear
installations for such indemnification.
139. CSC, supra note 8, art. V.
140. Id. at art. XIII(2) provides that the EEZ State has notified the Depositary.
141. Id. at art. XIII(l).
142. Id. at art. XIII(3).
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the competent court, subject to the Vienna or Paris
is in general the law 14of
3
provisions.
Convention
VI. A COMPARISON OF THE 1997 VIENNA PROTOCOL WITH THE 1963 CONVENTION
The 1997 Protocol followed a widespread recognition that the liability
limitation amounts were too low, that an additional fund was required, that the time
limitation periods were too restrictive, that the definition of nuclear damage was
too restrictive, that a regime must address environmental damage and that the
1 44
Those advances call for a close
geographical scope should be widened.
examination.
On State liability, the 1997 Protocol was a mixed step. The 1963 Convention
provided that the Convention "shall not be construed as affecting the rights, if any,
of a Contracting Party under the general rules of public international law in respect
of nuclear damage." 145 The 1997 Protocol amended this to provide that "This
Convention shall not affect the rights and obligations of a Contracting Party under
14 6
the general rules of public international law."' While the new provision avoided
the 'if any' language, it dropped the reference to rules "in respect of nuclear
damage". 147 On balance, this seems to be a step backwards as respondent States
may still deny the existence of any rules in respect of nuclear damage under
customary international law, whereas48 the earlier formulation cast doubt on the
rights instead of the rules themselves. 1
One advance in the Protocol is Article IA, which provides that the Convention
applies to nuclear damage 'wherever suffered', whereas the 1963 Convention was
silent as to the point. However, Parties may by legislation exclude damage
suffered in the territory of non-Party States or their maritime zones where that State
49
has a nuclear installation and it does not provide reciprocal benefits. 1 No change
in the Convention to incidents occurring in the
is made to the lack of1restriction
50
territory of non-Parties.
Under Article XI of the 1963 Vienna Convention a claim can be brought "only
with the courts of the Contracting Party within whose territory the nuclear incident
occurred" and if that location cannot be determined "with the courts of the
Installation State of the operator liable." If an incident occurred on a UK flagged
vessel in an area outside the territorial sea of any nation, a claim could be brought
only in a British court.
143. Id. at art. XIV.
144. See Protocol, supra note 7, at Preamble, and discussion in the IAEA Explanatory Texts, supra
note 25, at 18 - 21.
145. Vienna Convention, supra note 2,art. XVIII
146. Protocol, supra note 7, art. 16.
147. Id.
148. See discussion of negotiations on State liability in the IAEA Explanatory Texts, supra note 25, at
25 -27.
149. Protocol, supra note 7, art. IA(2) and (3).
150. This is in contrast to the Paris Convention, article 2 of which excludes nuclear incidents
occurring in the territory of non-Parties or to damage suffered in such territory unless the national
legislation of the operator otherwise provides. Paris Convention, supranote 3, art. 2.
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Under the 1997 Protocol a new provision is to be added to Article XI that
provides:
Where a nuclear incident occurs within the area of the exclusive
economic zone of a Contracting Party or, if such a zone has not been
established, in an area not exceeding the limits of an exclusive economic
zone, were one to be established, jurisdiction over actions concerning
nuclear damage from that nuclear incident shall, for the purposes of this
Convention, lie only with the courts of that Party.
This will only help if the shipping nations ratify the 1997 Protocol and if the
country in which the incident occurs has also ratified the 1997 Protocol. It will
also not apply if the accident occurs outside the EEZ but the damage is suffered
within the EEZ. Installation States can exclude liability for damage in a non-Party
51
nuclear State or its EEZ where that State does not offer reciprocal benefits.1
This means that non-nuclear States need not necessarily join the revised
Convention to share in at least some of its benefits, though only the courts of a
Contracting Party expressly have jurisdiction over an incident occurring within an
EEZ.152 The Installation State may exclude damage suffered in the territory or
EEZ of a non-Contracting State for non-nuclear States which do not afford
equivalent reciprocal benefits. 153
The Protocol for the first time excludes military installations, despite silence
in the 1963 Vienna Convention on the application of the Convention to military
installations, 154 even though many delegates during the negotiations reportedly felt
155
rather than taking the
that victims of all nuclear incidents should be compensated
opportunity to clarify its application to all nuclear installations. A new article
provides that the Convention shall not apply to nuclear installations used for nonpeaceful purposes. However, this provision did not define 'non-peaceful purposes'
and, as defined, any 'non-peaceful purpose' could exclude the application of the
revised Convention. It is unfortunate that States were not required to notify nonpeaceful installations in order to gain an exemption. A nuclear installation that
produces weapons-grade plutonium as part of its civil reprocessing functions may
well be excluded from coverage.
A. Definition of NuclearIncident
The 1997 Protocol defines 'nuclear incident' to mean "any occurrence or
series of occurrences having the same origin which causes nuclear damage or, but
only with respect to preventive measures, creates a grave and imminent threat of

151. Revised Vienna Convention, supra note 56, art. 1A(2).
152. Id. at art. XI.
153. Id. at art. IA.
154. The Vienna Convention Preamble does state that the Parties recognize the desirability of
establishing some minimum standards to provide financial protection against damage resulting from
certain peaceful uses of nuclear energy, but otherwise is silent on military installations. Vienna
Convention, supra note 2, at Preamble.
155. IAEA Explanatory Texts, supra note 25, at 29.
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causing such damage."1 56 The latter phrase is an addition to the 1963 Convention.
There is no definition of 'grave and imminent threat', but it seems clear that it must
both be a grave and an imminent threat of causing 'nuclear damage.' Being
imminent would not then suffice. Nor is it clear who must determine whether a
threat is 'grave and imminent'. A grave threat in the view of a coastal State may
not be viewed as grave by another State or its courts, and the 'grave' may be
determined under the lex fori, although 'reasonable measures' were taken.
However, preventive measures are subject to the approval of competent authorities
where the measures were taken,15 7 which may give rise to an argument that the law
of that state should decide what preventive measures constitute a grave and
imminent threat. This, however, is countered by the definition of 'reasonable58
measures' which are to be found as such by the 'law of the competent court,' 1
which is to mean the law of the court having jurisdiction under the Convention,
including any rules of such law relating to conflict of laws.
This could have been addressed by the 1997 Protocol but was not: 'preventive
measures' are defined to mean reasonable measures taken after a nuclear incident
has occurred, subject to the approval of competent authorities by the law of the
State where the measures were taken. 159 'Reasonable measures' are defined to
mean measures which are found under the law of the competent1 60court to be
appropriate and proportionate, having regard to all the circumstances.
So the revised Convention is in the curious position where 'nuclear incident'
is to include occurrences which create a threat of causing nuclear damage, with
respect to preventive measures, but where preventive measures are defined in terms
of measures taken "after a nuclear incident has occurred." While a commonsense
interpretation may be that a 'nuclear incident' includes a series of occurrences
which create a grave and imminent threat which preventive measures are aimed at
preventing, this seems to be a potential 'catch-22' where a State faced with a threat
will have to decide to take measures without any certainty of compensation, in a
case where the only nuclear damage is the damage that is threatened.
Likewise, whether a threat is 'grave and imminent' may give rise to dispute.
Whether a drifting radioactive cloud drifts a particular direction or distance could
give rise to such a dispute as to whether an incident is likely to give rise to
radioactive release at all. Whether a radioactive transport which is encountering
difficulties such as a collision, fire or terrorist attack constitutes a 'grave and
imminent threat' is another area where conflicts may well arise. An operator may
argue a threat was not imminent, or if it was, fhat it was not grave in the sense of
threatening great harm.

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Revised Vienna Convention, supranote 56, art. I(l)(1).
Id. at art. I(l)(n).
Id. at art. I(1)(e).
Id. atart. 1(n).
Id. at art. I(o).
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161
whereas the Paris
The Paris 2004 Protocol uses the 1963 wording,
adding
by
it
Convention qualifies

provided that such occurrence or succession of occurrences, or any of
the damage caused, arises out of or results either from the radioactive
properties, or a combination of radioactive properties with toxic,
explosive, or other hazardous properties of nuclear fuel or radioactive
products or waste or with any of them, or from ionizing radiations
162
emitted by any source of radiation inside a nuclear installation.
The Revised Vienna Convention is thus the most advanced in terms of
definition. With the above caveats in mind, the definition of nuclear damage will
now be examined.
B. Definition of NuclearDamage
The definition of nuclear damage in the 1963 Convention is simply "(i) loss of
life, (ii) any personal injury or any loss of, or damage to, property" to the extent
that the loss or damage arises out of or results from ionizing radiation emitted by
any source of radiation inside a nuclear installation, as well as any other loss or
damage so arising or resulting if and to the extent that the law of the competent
court so provides. 163 Economic loss and environmental damage is not specifically
defined, except to the extent national legislation so provides. The Protocol now
includes a far more extensive definition, but each head of damage is conditioned
and, more significantly, each new type of damage is allowable only 'to the extent
determined by the law of the competent court.'
(iii) economic loss arising from loss or damage referred to in subparagraph (i) or (ii), insofar as not included in those sub-paragraphs, if
incurred by a person entitled to claim in respect of such loss or damage;
(iv) the costs of measures of reinstatement of impaired environment,
unless such impairment is insignificant, if such measures are actually
taken or to be taken, and insofar as not included in sub-paragraph (ii);
(v) loss of income deriving from an economic interest in any use or
enjoyment of the environment, incurred as a result of a significant
impairment of that environment, and insofar as not included in subparagraph (ii);
(vi) the costs of preventive measures, and further loss or damage caused
by such measures;
(vii) any other economic loss, other than any caused by the impairment of
the environment, if permitted by the general law on civil liability of the

competent court

164

161. Paris Convention, supra note 3, art. (a)(i).
162. Id.
163. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 11(k)(i)&(ii).
164. Revised Vienna Convention, supra note 56, art. 2(k)(iii - vii).
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This means that those types of damage are compensable only if the law of the
nuclear Installation State permits it. This then is largely an illusory advance. A
victim in another State will only be able to recover damage if the law of the nuclear
State allows it. 165 This proviso was added after considerable wrangling within the
Drafting Committee, and developed from a proposal by Germany, which is phasing
out nuclear energy, to condition entitlement to 'pure economic loss' related to
environmental impairment to this proviso. This suggestion was progressively
widened until a proposal by France, a major nuclear energy State, to subject all
except the original three heads to this proviso. 166 While these claims are in theory
admissible, obviously if the Installation State allows zero recovery, then the claim
would be academic. The head of other economic loss in (vii) is further
conditioned: "(vii) any other economic loss, other than any caused by the
impairment of the environment, if permitted by the general law on civil liability of
the competent court." So the very admissibility of that head is conditioned on 'the
general law.' The much-touted aim of harmonization of nuclear liability laws is
entirely missed by this formulation.
The limitation of compensation to measures actually taken omits any value of
the impairment of the environment as such where reinstatement or remediation is

not possible, taking into account any impact on biodiversity and the non-economic
value of the environment, including value to future generations.
The difficulties of the victim do not stop there.

Article 11.6 of the Protocol

provides that:
No person shall be liable for any loss or damage which is not nuclear
damage pursuant to sub- paragraph (k) of paragraph 1 of Article I but

165. See id. at art. 2(k)(i - vii). "Nuclear damage" means - (i) loss of life, any personal injury; (ii)
loss of or damage to property; and each of the following to the extent determined by the law of the
competent court (iii) economic loss arising from loss or damage referred to in sub-paragraph (i) or (ii), insofar as not
included in those sub-paragraphs, if incurred by a person entitled to claim in respect of such loss or
damage;
(iv) the costs of measures of reinstatement of impaired environment, unless such impairment is
insignificant, if such measures are actually taken or to be taken, and insofar as not included in subparagraph (ii);
(v) loss of income deriving from an economic interest in any use or enjoyment of the environment,
incurred as a result of a significant impairment of that environment, and insofar as not included in subparagraph (ii);
(vi) the costs of preventive measures, and further loss or damage caused by such measures;
(vii) any other economic loss, other than any caused by the impairment of the environment, if permitted
by the general law on civil liability of the competent court,
inthe case of sub-paragraphs (i) to (v) and (vii) above, to the extent that the loss or damage arises out of
or results from ionizing radiation emitted by any source of radiation inside a nuclear installation, or
emitted from nuclear fuel or radioactive products or waste in, or of nuclear material coming from,
originating in, or sent to, a nuclear installation, whether so arising from the radioactive properties of such
matter, or from a combination of radioactive properties with toxic, explosive or other hazardous
properties of such matter.
166. See IAEA Explanatory Texts, supra note 25, at 36 - 37, n.101.
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which could have been determined as such pursuant to the provisions of
that sub-paragraph.
This rather oddly worded provision, added at the suggestion of Sweden, 167 is
apparently intended to absolve any person other than the operator of liability under
the channeling principle. It is presumably intended to mean that if damage could
(in theory) have been determined to be damage by an applicable law, but was not,
then there is no liability for any other person.
There must in any case be an "emission of ionizing radiation" 168 for all except
preventive measures, 169 and the damage will be compensable 'to the extent that"
the loss or damage arises out of or results from ionizing radiation emitted by any
source of radiation inside a nuclear installation. The qualifying words clearly
restrict the ambit of compensation: 'to the extent that' implies a restriction.
C. Individual Categories ofDamage
1. Economic Loss
(iii) economic loss arisingfrom loss or damage referred to in sub-paragraph
(i) or (ii), insofar as not included in those sub-paragraphs,ifincurredby a person
entitled to claim in respect of such loss or damage,
This is economic loss arising from loss of life, any personal injury or any loss
of, or damage to, property - and to the extent that the loss or damage arises out of
or results from ionizing radiation emitted by any source of radiation inside a
nuclear installation. Loss of income arising from personal injury or death, or lost
income from damaged property would be covered, provided it is not already
included in the main categories of damage.
This is important, as the economic loss is predicated on the injury, death or
damage to property. Economic loss arising in other ways, such as loss to businesses
such as tourism or fisheries, where the area or product is not directly damaged,
would not be compensable. This is an ongoing issue with coastal States, who are
very concerned that if an incident occurred in or near their waters, then tourists
would stop coming or fish would not be purchased due to fear of contamination,
actual or real. The very real economic loss would not be arising from actual
damage to property. Conceivably, one resort may receive compensation where
there are measurable increased radiation levels but a nearby one may not, where
there are no measurable increased levels.
The group of Small Island States, comprising over forty-two States in the
Caribbean, the Pacific, and the AIMS (Atlantic, Indian Ocean, and Mediterranean

167. Id.
168. Revised Vienna Convention, supra note 56, art. 1.1(k)
169. Id. This extended the 1963 Convention, which requires in article I(1)(k) nuclear damage to arise
out of or result from the radioactive properties of nuclear fuel or radioactive products or waste in a
nuclear installation, or of nuclear material. In other words, damage from, "other ionizing radiation emitted
by any other source of radiation inside a nuclear installation" is now covered. This was already the case
in the 1960 Paris Convention under article I(a)(i).
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170
to implement
and South China Seas) regions adopted a Mauritius and strategy
171
for their sustainable development. That
the Barbados Programme of Action
statement noted that their concerns with nuclear transports include the further
development and strengthening, within the appropriate fora, of international
regulatory regimes to enhance safety, disclosure, liability, security and
compensation in relation to such transport.

The Pacific Island Forum 2004 Communiqu6 172 stated that:
30. Leaders reiterated their concerns about possible economic loss in a
non- release situation and sought an assurance from shipping States that
where there is a demonstrable link between the incident and economic
loss Forum countries would not be left to carry such a loss unsupported
by the shipping States. Leaders agreed that further work be undertaken
on the case for a region-specific Environment Impact Assessment
including the extent to which the IAEA and shipping States' EIAs
adequately take account of region-specific dimensions and on any
examples of claims being made for rumour-type damage.

This year the Secretary-General of the Pacific Island Forum, Mr Greg Erwin,
during the passage of a shipment of High Level Waste through the Pacific, stated
that the Forum remains concerned that present international arrangements for
liability and compensation do not adequately address the risks posed by shipments
through the region. He said:
We have a real worry about possible economic loss in the event of an
incident involving a nuclear shipment, whether or not that incident
results in a radioactive release. The fragile economies of Forum Island
Countries depend heavily on industries involving our ocean, such as
fisheries and tourism. We continue to seek assurances from the
shipping states that where there is a demonstrable link between an
incident and economic loss, Forum members will not be left to carry
173
such a loss unsupported.

170. International Meeting to Review the Implementation of the Programme of Action for the
Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States, , Jan. 10 - 14, 2005, MauritiusStrategy
for the Further Implementation of the Programme of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small
Island States
, U.N.
Doc
A/CONF.207/CRP.7
(Jan.
13,
2005),
available at
http://www.un.org/smallislands2005/pdf/sids strategy.pdf.
171. Global Conference on the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States,
Bridgetown, Barbados, Apr. 25 - May 6, 1994, Programme of Action for the Sustainable Development
of Small IslandDeveloping States, U.N. Doc A/CONF. 167/9 (Oct. 1994)
172. The Forum Communiqu6, Thirty Fourth Pacific Islands Forum, (Aug. 14 - 16, 2003) stated
that "34. Leaders reiteratedtheir continuing concerns over the shipment of radioactivematerials through
the region. It welcomed the recent assuranceby shipping States to take all practicableaction to assist in
the management of an incident,whether or not such an incident involved the release of radioactivity,and
to cooperate effectively with any state concerned, particularlystates close to where any accident had
taken place. Leaders called on shipping States to continue the dialogue with Forum members and in
particular,to progress the proposals that Forum members had developed for innovative arrangements
and assurances."
173. Press Statement, Thirty Fourth Pacific Islands Forum, "Forum Expresses Concern on Nuclear
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Clearly coastal States are most concerned at the possibility of economic loss
from an incident which may occur without direct physical damage or loss.
2. Environmental Impairment
(iv) the costs of measures of reinstatement of impaired environment,
unless such impairment is insignificant, ifsuch measures are actually
taken or to be taken, and insofar as not included in sub-paragraph(ii);
This is a clear advance from the 1963 Convention. However, it is limited to
costs of reinstatement. The subparagraph is silent as to compensation where
reinstatement is not practicable or possible, as may well be the case with
widespread contamination, particularly of the marine environment. Some measures
could be envisaged, such as replacement of soil, replanting and reintroduction of
species, although these measures may substantially exceed the limitations of 300
million SDRs.
The European Directive on Liability Directive 2004/35/EC' 74 excludes
damage covered by specific nuclear liability Conventions; but, by way of
comparison, it requires Operators to take restorative measures where environmental
damage has occurred 1 75 and to take preventive measures where environmental
damage has not yet occurred but there is an imminent threat of such damage
occurring, 176 failing which, Authorities are to take preventative or restorative
measures. 177 Environmental damage means damage to protected species and
78
natural habitats, water damage and land damage creating a risk to human health. 1
This is clearly wider than the requirement to pay for reinstatement where
measures are actually taken unless such impairment is insignificant, and requires
operators to take steps concerned - the costs of which could exceed the applicable
limits.
(v) loss of income deriving from an economic interest in any use or
enjoyment of the environment, incurred as a result of a significant
impairment of that environment, and insofar as not included in subparagraph(ii)
Again, this head is predicated on actual damage to the environment. It is an
advance as it does not require property damage by the person affected, so a
fisherman without property interest in the fish can still claim damages. However,
the IAEA Explanatory Text suggests that a tourist operator may have a claim
because tourists stay away for fear that the beach may be contaminated. 7 9 The
Shipments," availableat http://www.forumsec.org.fj/news/2005/April/Ol.htm.
174. Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 2004/35/EC, on environmental liability
with regard to the prevention and remedying of environmental damage, art. 4, 2004 O.J. (L 143/56),
available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2004/1-143/1-1432004043oen00560075.pdf.
175. Id. at art. 6.
176. Id. at art. 5.
177. Id. at arts. 5(3) & 6(2).
178. Id. at art. 2(l)(a)(b)(c).
179. IAEA Explanatory Texts, supra note 25, at 38. The Text does go on to observe that if a ship
with nuclear substances sinks, but there is no emission, there is no coverage for economic loss suffered
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Text does not condition that statement on an assumption that there was some sort of
radioactive contamination somewhere causing the public fear, as opposed to an
incident which did not result in the release of radiation. Even if the premise is
added that there is some sort of contamination somewhere from the incident, this is
still unlikely to be correct as it seems likely that the beach must actually be
contaminated-'a significant impairment of that environment'-to the extent that
the loss or damage arises out of or results from ionizing radiation emitted by any
source of radiation inside a nuclear installation. Thus, if a nuclear carrier sinks
causing localized contamination in the marine environment, but that contamination
does not reach the beach, it is likely the Operator would claim that the loss or
damage did not arise out of or resulting from ionizing radiation and that there is not
a significant impairment of 'that' environment.
Additionally, there is no definition of 'significant'. In the context of ionizing
radiation this is a 'significant' omission. As there is always a certain of level of
background radiation, Operators are likely to argue that a very small level of
increase in background radiation is not 'significant', even to the extent of requiring
actual or potential damage from that increase, as opposed to an increase in concern
by potential tourists, for instance.
3. Preventive Measures
(vi) the costs of preventive measures, andfurther loss or damage caused by
such measures;
It is clear from the definition of 'preventive measures' that that the preventive
measures need to have been taken;1 80 the definition requires that the preventive
measures must be taken after an 'incident' has occurred, 81 but can be taken before
the damage has occurred. However, since 'nuclear damage' is part of the
definition of 'nuclear incident', this could be argued to be a catch-22, where the
only 'nuclear damage' is that being prevented. 182 The converse argument is that a
grave and imminent threat can form part of the definition of nuclear incident, but
thus does run into the difficulty that preventive measures can only be taken after
83
the nuclear incident has occurred. 1
A difficult question may arise where the preventive measure caused, for
instance, loss of tourism or fisheries markets, and there was no actual
contamination, whether because the preventive measure prevented contamination
or because no contamination eventuated. Ironically, if the loss or damage was
caused by the preventive measure 84 rather than the incident itself, the loss or
damage may be recoverable, but only to the extent determined by the law of the
competent court.

by public fear of contamination.
180. Revised Vienna Convention, supra note 56, art. 2(4)(n).
181. Id.
182. See IAEA Explanatory Texts, supra note 25, at 42, n. 118.
183. Revised Vienna Convention, supra note 56, at art. 2(4)(n).
184. Id. at art. (2)(k)(vi). This section includes further loss or damage caused by preventive
measures.
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Another question which may arise is whether measures taken must be taken
within the jurisdiction. Where a radioactive shipment threatens an EEZ, for
instance, even if it is outside the EEZ, can preventive measures be taken in or
outside the EEZ? The I-NS Convention 185 and the 1969 Oil Liability Convention,
as amended, 186 applies to preventive measures 'wherever taken.'
(vii) any other economic loss, other than any caused by the impairment of the
environment, ifpermitted by the general law on civil liability of the competent
court,
This residual head is potentially applicable to pure economic loss, as it is not
predicated on actual damage or injury. However, it is only 'if permitted' by the
'general law on civil liability of the competent court' in which the nuclear
installation is operated. "Law of the competent court" is defined in article I(1)(a)
to mean the law of the court having jurisdiction under the Convention, including
any rules of such law relating to conflict of laws. However, it seems that 'general
law on civil liability' is intended to be different and to refer to the substantive law
of the forum Court, rather than the substantive law applied under the conflict of
laws.1 87 If so, this would be inequitable as it would subject the claim of a victim in
another State to the laws of the Installation State which caused the damage. This
residual head of damage does not appear in the 2004 Paris Protocol.
VII. A COMPARISON

OF THE REVISED PARIS AND VIENNA CONVENTIONS

The revised Vienna Convention is of wider territorial application. It applies to
nuclear damage wherever it is suffered, 188 whereas the revised Paris convention
applies mainly to nuclear damage occurring on the territory of contracting Parties
as well as on the territory of revised Vienna Convention Parties, which are also
parties to the Joint Protocol.' 89 It also applies to damage suffered in the territory of
non-nuclear States and other non-Contracting States which have in force reciprocal
nuclear liability legislation. 190 The Paris Convention, therefore, excludes damage
caused on the high seas or otherwise beyond areas of national jurisdiction, other
than EEZs. As one commentator has noted, "[f]rom an environmental point of
view this is an important difference with the Amended Vienna Convention as it
leaves the natural resources of the high seas and the international seabed area
uncovered, which cannot but be deplored."' 9'

185. HNS Convention, supra note 59, at art. 3(d).
186. Oil Pollution Convention, supranote 60, at art. 4(b).
187. See IAEA Explanatory Texts, supra note 25, at 38 - 39 n.106. (quoting Report of the Standing
Committee, Annex III, SCNL/17/INF.4, pp. 16 - 18, and explaining that this wording was inserted at the
request of the United Kingdom).
188. Revised Vienna Convention, supranote 56, at art. I A
189. Paris Convention, supra note 3, at art. 2. This is provided that the Paris Contracting Party is
also a contracting Party to the Joint Protocol.
190. Revised Paris Convention, supra note 57, at art. 2(a)(iv).
191. See Johan G. Lammers, International Responsibility and Liability for Damage Caused by
POL'Y & LAW (2001), at 99 available at
Environmental Interferences, ENVTL.
http://iospress.metapress.com/media/2gurmhtuxnOjtcj2cb9q/contributions/q/5/6/p/q56pjg9bw6qy6pq7.pdf.
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Secondly, the new definition of nuclear damage in the two Conventions is
revised Paris
very similar, although the definition of nuclear damage in the
92
Convention does not include catch-all 'any other economic loss'.1
Thirdly, the liability amounts differ. The revised Paris Convention provides
for minimum liability to €700 million, with various exceptions. 193 The revised
Vienna Convention provides for 300 million SDRs (about €357 million).194 The
liability of €700 million, whereas
revised Paris Convention provides for maximum 95
the Vienna Convention does not set a maximum. 1
The revised Paris Convention 196 permits a Contracting Party to subject the
transit of nuclear substances through its territory on the condition that the
maximum amount of liability of the foreign operator concerned be increased if it
considers that such amount does not adequately cover the risks of a nuclear
incident in the course of the transit, provided that the maximum amount thus
increased does not exceed the maximum amount of liability of operators of nuclear
installations situated in its territory. This may provide a mechanism for transit
States to protect themselves by increasing required liability considerably. There is
no comparable provision in the Vienna Convention.
A. Jurisdiction
As is noted below, both the revised Paris Convention 197 and the revised
Vienna Convention grant exclusive jurisdiction to the Party in whose EEZ a
nuclear incident has occurred. 198 However, if the incident occurs outside the EEZ
but the damage is within the EEZ, jurisdiction is with the Installation State. 99
The Brussels Supplementary Protocol applies to damage suffered in an EEZ
or on the continental shelf of a Contracting Party, but only in connection with the
exploitation or the exploration of the natural resources of the EEZ or continental
shelf, and where the operator is liable under the Paris Convention. 200 This means

192. Revised Paris Convention, supra note 57, at art. l(vii). Revised Vienna Convention, supra note
56, at art. 2(2)(k)(vii).
193. See Revised Paris Convention, supra note 57, at art. 7.
194. Revised Vienna Convention, supra note 56, at art. 7(1)(a).
195. See Revised Paris Convention, supra note 57, at art. 7(e). See Revised Vienna Convention,
supra note 56, at art. 7(l)(a).
196. Revised Paris Convention, supra note 57, at art.7(e).
197. Revised Paris Convention, supra note 57, art. 13(b). The coastal State must have notified the
Secretary-General of the EEZ.
198. Revised Vienna Convention, supra note 56, at art. XI(lbis).
199. Revised Paris Convention, supra note 57, at art. 13(c)
200. The Brussels Supplementary Protocol applies to nuclear damage for which an operator of a
nuclear installation used for peaceful purposes situated in the territory of a Contracting Party to the
Convention is liable under the Paris Convention, and which is suffered either (i) in the territory of a
Contracting Party or (ii) in or above maritime areas beyond the territorial sea of a contracting Party and
(1) on board or by a ship flying the flag of a Contracting party, or on board or by an aircraft registered in
the territory of a Contracting Party, or on or by an artificial island, installation or structure under the
jurisdiction of a Contracting Party, or by a national of a Contracting Party, excluding damage suffered in
or above the territorial sea of a State not Party to the Convention; or in and above the EEZ of a
Contracting Party or on the continental shelf of a Contracting Party in connection with the exploitation or
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that if an incident occurs in an EEZ, reinstatement of the environment or preventive
measures may be compensable under the BSP if it is in connection with the
exploitation or exploration of natural resources or continental shelf. Clearly, this is
intended to be narrower than protection of the marine environment per se.
B. Limitation in Time
The Vienna Convention 20 1 imposes a ten-year time limitation from the date of
the nuclear incident on the filing of claims. The 1997 Protocol would extend this
limit to 30 years, but only "with respect to loss of life and personal injury. ' 2 °2
Such short limits are unacceptable because it may take many more years for the
true nature of the risks to be determined. The provision should include a period
following discovery of the injury, even if is more than 30 years from the incident.
Genetic damage, for instance, may take more than 30 years to manifest itself in
future generations.
The IAEA Explanatory Text explained the Vienna Convention's ten year
period after the incident (or even three years of knowledge of the damage20 3 )
limitation period - in contrast with the more common 30 years - in terms of "the
need not to put a prohibitive burden on persons engaged in nuclear activities; it was
felt that operators and their guarantors should not be obliged to maintain over long
periods commitments that might prove to be merely theoretical., 20 4 This is despite
the fact that radioactive contamination may last for hundreds of years, and
consequent genetic damage may be passed down through generations.20 5
Subsequent generations are likely, thus, to be excluded.
The 1960 Paris Convention has a limitation period of ten years.20 6 However,
the period is increased to twenty years in the case of date of the theft, loss, jettison
or abandonment.20 7 A two year period may be established from the date at which
the person suffering damage has knowledge or from the date at which he ought
reasonably to have knowledge.20 t
The 2004 Protocol increases the period to thirty years from the nuclear
incident with respect to loss of life and personal injury, or ten years with respect to
other nuclear damage. 209

the exploration of the natural resources of that EEZ or continental shelf, provided that the courts of a
Contracting Party have jurisdiction pursuant to the Paris Convention. 2004 Brussels Supplementary
Protocol, supra note 128, at art. 2.
201. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, at art. Vl(1)(a).
202. Protocol, supra note 7, art. VI(l)(a).
203. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. VI.3. Provides for three years from the date on which the
person suffering damage had knowledge or ought reasonably to have had knowledge of the damage and
of the operator liable for the damage.
204. IAEA Explanatory Texts, supra note 25, at 14.
205. A longer period is possible if the operator's liability is covered by a financial security or State
funds for a longer period. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. VI(4).
206. Revised Paris Convention, supra note 3, art. 8.
207. Id. at art. 8 (b).
208. Id. at art. 8(c).
209. 2004 Protocol, supra note 120, art. 1.
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21°
or twenty
The CSC Convention provides for a ten year limitation period,
2
years from the date of the theft, loss,jettison or abandonment. "'

C. Standing
The revised Vienna Convention has very limited provisions on standing,
providing only that the State of jurisdiction shall ensure that a State may bring an
action on behalf of persons who have suffered nuclear damage. 12 This would assist
victims in access to foreign courts, but does not go far enough. It is only a small
mitigation of the disadvantage of having to seek compensation from other courts
and does not, on the face of it, extend to environmental damage.
Economic loss may be claimed only if incurred by a person entitled to claim
in respect of such loss or damage.2 13 Thus, there is a significant question mark on
whether environmental groups could sue for the costs of measures of reinstatement
of impaired environment, of income deriving from an economic interest in any use
or enjoyment of the environment incurred as a result of a significant impairment of
that environment, or the cost of preventive measures.214
The revised Paris Convention has similar provisions, 215 also limiting
economic loss to a person 'entitled to claim', without defining what constitutes
such entitlement, thus leaving it to the lexfori. However, it does provide 216 that the
legislation of the State where the nuclear damage is suffered shall determine who is
entitled to take reinstatement measures and that preventive measures are taken
subject to the approval of competent authorities in the law of the State where the
measures were taken.217

D. Exceptions
Under the Vienna Convention, 2 8 damages resulting from "an act of armed
conflict, hostilities, civil war or insurrection" or from "a grave natural disaster of
an exceptional character" are exempt from any liability or recovery. The latter
exception has been removed from the 1997 Protocol, which is an advance, but the
other exceptions remain in the Revised Convention. The 1997 Vienna Protocol
provides that "No liability under this Convention shall attach to an operator if he
proves that the nuclear damage is directly due to an act of armed conflict,
hostilities, civil war or insurrection."2 19 Thus, the burden of proof is on the
operator.
210. CSC, supra note 8, art. 9. "The law of the competent court may establish a period of extinction
or prescription of not less than three years from the date on which the person suffering nuclear damage
had knowledge or should have had knowledge of the damage and of the operator liable for the damage,
provided that the period established pursuant to paragraphs I and 2 shall not be exceeded."
211. Id. at art. 9.
212. Revised Vienna Convention, supra note 56, art. XIA.
213. Id. at art. 1(k)
214. Id.
215. Id. at art. l(a)(vii)(iii)
216. Id. at art. l(a)(viii)
217. Revised Paris Convention, supranote 57, art. l(a)(xi).
218. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. IV(3).
219. Protocol, supra note 7, art. 6.
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This means that under either Convention, in case of a threat of a terrorist
attack on an installation or vessel, the burden is borne by peoples and nations other
than the nuclear industry or nuclear State. The 2004 Paris Protocol provides that
"the operator shall not be liable for nuclear damage caused by a nuclear incident
220
directly due to an act of armed conflict, hostilities, civil war, or insurrection.,
So in both treaty systems, damage caused by an attack or terrorism may well be
borne by the victim.
VIII. SOME NATIONAL LEGISLATION ON NUCLEAR LIABILITY

A. United States
The United States is not party to any nuclear liability convention. The Price
Anderson Act, which was recently extended for 20 years, 221 instead provides a
nuclear liability regime. The Act requires individual operators to be responsible
for two layers of insurance cover: each operator is required to purchase USD 300
million cover from private insurers, and a second layer is funded through payments
of up to USD 96 million per reactor, collected in annual installments of USD 15
million per reactor.222 The total provision comes to over USD 10 billion paid for by
the utilities. If funds are depleted by accidents, Congress is required to consider
covering excess claims.223 USD 70 million was paid out after the Three Mile
Island incident. 224 As with international conventions, Price-Anderson, with its
limitations of liability and channeling provisions, 225 amounts to a subsidy to the
3 billion per year
nuclear industry, estimated from USD 366 million
nationwide.226
B. Canada
The 1976 Nuclear Liability Act 227 establishes the operator's liability to a limit
of C$75 million per nuclear installation and requires insurance to that level.228

220. 2004 Protocol, supra note 120, art. J.
221. The Price Anderson Act was signed into law in 1957 as an amendment to the Atomic Energy
Act of 1955. 42 U.S.C. § 2210 et seq. (1994), available at http://www.gc.doe.gov/price-anderson/publiccomments/Nuclear%/20Energy%20Agency/paa-appb.pdf [hereinafter Price Anderson Act]. It was
renewed on Aug. 8, 2005 in the Energy Policy Act 2005, to cover licensed nuclear power plants and other
facilities through Dec. 31 2005.
222. Price-Anderson Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-408, § 2(b) (1988).
223. Price Anderson Act, supra note 221, § (e)(2).
224. Jason Zorn,Note: Compensation in the Event of a TerroristAttack on a Nuclear Power Plant:
Will Victims Be Adequately Protected?,38 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1087, 1128 n.310 (2003).
225. Anyone liable is covered: 42 U.S.C. § 2014(t).
226. See testimony by Anna Aurilio of the U.S. Public Interest Group to the Committee on Energy
at
available
Commerce
and
also
See
http://energycommerce.house.gov/107/hearings/0627200l Hearing3O5/Aurilio492print.htm.
Renewable Energy Policy Project, July 2000, "Federal Energy Subsidies: Not all technologies are created
equal," available athttp://www.crest.org/repp-pubs/pdf/subsidies.pdf.
227. Nuclear Liability Act, 1985, c. N-85, available at http:////lois.justice.gc.ca/en/N-28 [hereinafter
Nuclear Liability Act].
228. Id. at § 15. "Damage" is defined to mean any loss of or damage to property, whether real or
personal, and, for the purposes of any other provision of this Act, includes any damage arising out of or
attributable to any loss of or damage to that property.
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Liability is strict,22 9 and there is an exemption for an act of armed conflict in the
course of war, invasion or insurrection.23 °
C. Japan
Japan is not party to any liability convention. Its Law on Compensation for
Nuclear Damage 23 provides for strict, exclusive and unlimited liability for
operators, and operators must provide financial security such as 12 billion yen for
232
An Indemnity Law provides for
the Tokai-mura uranium conversion plant.
indemnification by the government in exchange for an indemnity fee. 233
Following the 1999 Tokai-mura plant accident, insurance covered 1 billion
vr235
th parent company, paid the balance of over
12 billion yen,
yen. 234 Sumitomo, the
of which 3.86 billion was to foodstuffs manufacturers, 2.86 billion236to tourist
operators, 1.76 to food retailers and 1.26 billion to agriculture interests.
D. Russia
Russia, which operates 29 nuclear reactors, this year ratified the Vienna
Convention and has bilateral agreements to cover entities working under safety
assistance programs. Russia signed the Vienna Convention in May 1996, more
than 10 years after the Chernobyl accident.237 However, whether any Ukrainian
victims of the Chernobyl accident will be able to claim remains to be seen. 238 The
limitation period for loss of life or personal injury under the 1997 Protocol is thirty
years following the date of the nuclear incident, 239 but neither Russia nor Ukraine
has ratified it to date. Processing of plutonium from decommissioned Russian
weapons has been delayed due to disputes between the United States and Russia on

229. Id. at § 4.
230. Id. at § 7.
231. Law on Compensation for Nuclear Damage, Law No. 147 of 17 June 1961, as amended. See
Nuclear Energy Agency [NEA], Tokai-Mura Accident, Japan: Third Party Liability and Compensation

available at
2000),
No.
66
(Dec.
Bulletin
Nuclear
Law
at
7,
Aspects,
http://www.nea.fr/html/law/nlb/Nib-66/013-022.pdf [hereinafter Tokai-Mura Accident Article]. See
also Omer F. Brown, Nuclear Liability: A Continuing Impediment To Nuclear Commerce, 1999,
availableat http://www.world-nuclear.org/sym/1999/brown.htm.
232. Tokai-Mura Accident Article, supranote 231, at 7.
233. Law on the Indemnity Agreement for Compensation for Nuclear Damage, Law No. 148 of 17
June 1961, as amended.
234. Tokai-Mura Accident Article, supra note 231, at 7.
Barkley's EURO Conversion Calculator at
235. Some €87 million at today's rates.
http://www.oasismanagement.com/eurodesk/eurocalc.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2006).
236. OECD, op. cit., 4 and Annex II.

at
available
Membership
Organization
International
.Russia:
237. NTI,
http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/intorgs/intorgs.htm. (last visited Oct. 17, 2006).
238. Ukraine is a party to the Vienna Convention. International Atomic Energy Agency, (1998),
availableat http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1998/infcirc566-567al .shtml.
239. Protocol, supra note 7, art. 8.
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liability provisions. 240 There are some bilateral agreements in place,2 4 1 such as the
2000 France-Russian agreement on third party liability for nuclear damage.242
E. Ukraine
Ukraine is Party to the Vienna Convention and the Joint Protocol, and has
signed the CSC. Its 1995 Nuclear Liability Law, revised in 1997 following its
accession to the Vienna Convention,243 has been followed by a Law on Civil
Liability for Nuclear Damage and its Financial Security in 2001.244 The Chemobyl
Shelter Implementation Plan (SIP) 245 covered participants in the Plan.
F. China
China is not party to any international liability convention. 46 China to date
has only a 1986 interim domestic law on nuclear liability, devised for the Daya
Bay nuclear power plant.247 The law provides for exclusive jurisdiction of Chinese
courts and liability limited to 30 million RMB, or about USD 36 million. 248 It
excludes massive natural disasters, hostilities, armed conflict or riot, and has a tenyear limitation period, and a three-year limitation period from the date the victim
knew or should have known of the nuclear damage.249
G. Austria
Austria in 1999 passed an Act on Civil Liability for Damages Caused by
Radioactivity. 25 0
The Act covers environmental impairment, defined as any
interference with the environment, which lastingly alters the latter in such a way
that it differs noticeably from natural processes either in quantity, in quality or in
the temporal respect, and the cost of preventive measures.2 1' No sudden incident is
required, and damage in the ordinary course of operation is covered. 25 2 Liability is

240. See NTI, Reducing Excess Stockpiles: Russian Plutonium Disposition at
http://www.nti.org/e-research/cnwm/reducing/rpdispose.asp_(last visited Oct. 17, 2006).
241. See Mark Hibbs, Safety of Civil Nuclear Installations, Part I: Safety of Civil Nuclear
Installations, Apr. 10, 2003, available at http://sung7.univ-lyon2.fr/article.php3?id-article=l 26.
242. See
NEA
Nuclear
Law
Bulletin
No.
66,
Dec.
2000,
available at
http://www.nea.fr/html/law/nlb/Nlb-66/welcome.html.
243. See
NTI,
Ukraine
Profile:
Nuclear
Safety
Related
Treaties available at
http://www.nti.org/e-research/profiles/Ukraine/index_4986.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2006).
244. NEA, Law on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and its Financial Security, Dec. 13, 2001,
availableat http://www.nea.fr/html/law/nlb/nlb-69/Ukraine.pdf.
245. See
IAEA,
Shelter
Implementation
Plan:
Chernobyl
Shelter
Fund,
at
http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Features/Chernobyl-I 5/shelter-fund.pdf (last visited Oct. 17, 2006).
246. NEA, Julie A. Schwartz, InternationalNuclear Law in the Post-Chernobyl Period,available
at http://www.nea.fr/html/law/chemobyl/SCHWARTZ.pdf.
247. See Brown, supra note 231.
248. Id.
249. See IIAS, Environmental Law of the People's Republic of China, Nov. 29, 2002, available at
http://www.iias.or.jp/old/research/research-e_top.html.
250. NEA, Federal Act on Civil Liability for Damage Caused by Radioactivity (Atomic Liability
Act 1999 - Atom HG 1999), Oct. 7, 1998, available at http://www.nea.fr/htmlllaw/nlb/NLB63/austria.pdf.
251. Id. at § 11.3 and IV.11(2).
252. Id. at § 11.7.
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strict and unlimited; there are no maximum liability amounts. There is no
channeling of liability, so suppliers and contractors can be liable. Insurance is
253
Claimants
required to be carried by nuclear carriers and any operators in Austria.
can require the application of Austrian law to claims for damage caused in
Austria , 2544 regardless of where the damaging event occurred.
H. Chile
Chile's Law for Nuclear Safety is an interesting law applicable to the transport
of nuclear substances and radioactive materials through Chile's EEZ.255 The Law
provides 256 that any transporter of nuclear substances or radioactive material who
uses the territorial sea, surrounding sea and the Chilean exclusive economic zone
will be considered as an operator, which must put up insurance or guarantees.257
The maximum liability is set at USD 75 million. 258 On the issue of causation, if
together with nuclear damage, damage occurs due to another different or
concurrent cause or resulting from a nuclear accident without it being possible to
make a distinction, all is deemed to be nuclear damage. 25 9 There is an exemption
for external armed hostilities, insurrection or civil war, but not for force majeure or
unforeseeable circumstances.260 There is a ten-year limitation period.26'

I. InternationalLiability Discussions Under Way
The International Expert Group on Nuclear Liability (INLEX) was established
following the International Conference on the Safety of Transport of Radioactive
Material in Vienna in 2003.262 Instead of exploring ways to progress the
international liability regime, consensus for which was blocked by some nuclear
States, the IAEA established INLEX to prepare an explanatory text to develop a
common understanding of the legal issues and thereby promote adherence to the
liability instruments. The text on the Vienna Convention 263 runs to some 107
pages.
Negotiations are under way to develop rules and procedures on liability in
redress under the Biosafety Protocol. The first meeting of the Ad Hoc Group on
Liability and Redress took place in May 2005 in Montreal, Canada, following a
meeting of Technical Group of Experts on Liability and Redress, which took place
from 18 to 20 October 2004 in Montreal. 2 4

253. Id. at § II.4,.5,.6(), .7(1).
254. Id. at § V.23.
255. BCN, Law for Nuclear Safety, 18.302, Apr. 16, 1984, (amended Oct. 1 2002) available at
http://www.bcn.cl/portada.html.

256. Id. at art. 54.
257. Id. at art. 62.
258. Id. at art. 60.
259. Id. at art. 55.
260. Id. at art. 56.
261. Id. atar. 66.
262. See IAEA, Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, GOV/INF/2004/9-GC (48)/INF/5, (Sept. 2,
2004) at http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC48/Documents/gc48inf-5.pdf.
263. IAEA Explanatory Texts, supra note 25.
264. See description of the process at http://www.biodiv.org/biosafety/issues/liability2.aspx. See also
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STUDIES

Some possible scenarios are postulated to provide examples of how the
liability system may work in practice.
A. The French company Cogema sends a shipment of nuclear waste to a
nuclearoperator in Japan onboardPNTL vessel PacificPintail,which flies a
UKflag. A nuclear incidentoccurs on the high seas nearFederatedStates of
Micronesia,releasingradiationin areas, which results in a collapse of the
FSMfishing and tourist industries and which also causes loss to Japanese,
MarshallIslands and Palautunafishingfleets who hold licenses to fish in
FSM's EEZ. There is no direct evidence that any tuna have been
contaminated,butfish caught in or near FSM's EEZ can't be sold. Tourists
stay away even though there are no increased levels of radioactivityon nearby
beaches.
Both the UK and France are Paris and Brussels Supplementary Convention
parties. FSM, Palau, Marshall Islands and Japan are not party to any liability treaty.
Fishing operators will have three options: either they can sue in the United
Kingdom or in France or in their own countries. If they sue in their own countries,
they will want to be sure they can enforce any judgment, either through a
multilateral agreement, 265 bilateral reciprocal judgment enforcement treaty or
otherwise. The prospect of success is not good, since the damage is arguably pure
economic loss because there is no evidence that fish that cannot be sold are
contaminated.
It is questionable whether fishing industries in any of those countries improve
their chances if States joined any of the liability Conventions. Since neither France
nor the UK a party to the Joint Protocol, the only option is to join the Paris
Convention. Since the Paris Convention Protocol is not in force, the only
applicable Convention will be the Paris Convention. There would most likely be
no recovery since the claim is not for damage to property caused by a nuclear
incident involving nuclear substances in the course of carriage. If there was
recovery, claims would be limited to the £140 million provided under the Nuclear
Installations Act 1965, beyond which the Paris/Brussels system applies. Recovery
under the Brussels Convention is limited to damage suffered in an EEZ or on the
continental shelf of a Contracting Party, in connection with the exploitation or the
exploration of the natural resources of the EEZ or continental shelf, and where the

Report of the Open-Ended Ad Hoc Working Group of Legal and Technical Experts on Liability and
Redress
under
the
Cartagena
Protocol
on
Biosafety
available
at
http://www.biodiv.org/doc/meeting.aspx?mtg=BSWGLR-01.
265. See Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction, supra note 55. See also Lugano Convention (Sept.
16, 1988),at http://www.jura.uni-sb.de/convention-bruxelles/en/c-textes/_lug-textes.htm.
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operator is liable under the Paris Convention.266 There would be no compensation
for restoration of the marine environment.
B. A terroristcell crashes an airlineronto Cogema's reprocessingplant at La
Hague, causing a radioactivereleases of Cs-137from a cask storagefacility
and causing the release of radioactivityacross northern Europe and across
the English Channel. Damageand economic loss are measured in the
hundreds of millions or billions of dollars. Hundreds die and thousands suffer
from radiationpoisoning.
France is a Paris and Brussels Supplementary Convention party, as is the
United Kingdom, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain and Belgium.
Claimants in those countries would lodge claims in French courts. They would be
subject to claims by the operator or its insurers that the exception in Article 9,
being 'armed conflict, hostilities, civil war, insurrection' applied. Claims would be
subject to a maximum of about €357 million under the BSC.
Claimants in States which are not Paris Convention or Joint Protocol
countries, including Austria, could file claims in their own Courts. They would not
be faced with exemption arguments and would be free of limitations. Russia and
Serbia and Montenegro, which are Vienna Convention but not Joint Protocol
countries, would be in the same position.
Claimants in Portugal, which is a Paris Convention but not Brussels
Supplementary Protocol party, would be subject to the Paris Convention limits of
E17.85 million. Claimants in the Czech Republic, Lithuania, and Slovakia and
Ukraine which are Vienna Convention and Joint Protocol countries, would also be
subject to the Paris Convention limits.
C. An accident at a nuclearpower station in Germany causes low, but
elevated levels of radiationto be detected in Austria, the Czech Republic,
Switzerlandand Italy. Dairyproducersand otherfarmersfind they cannot
sell theirproduce.
Germany is a Paris Convention country and party to the Brussels
Supplementary Convention as well as the Joint Protocol. The narrow definition of
recoverable damage would apply, so compensation would be restricted to damage

266. NEA, Convention of 31st January 1963 Supplementary to the Paris Convention of 29th July
1960, as amended by the additional Protocol of 28th January 1964 and by the Protocol of 16th
November 1982, art. 2 (explaining that the system of this Convention applies to nuclear damage for
which an operator of a nuclear installation used for peaceful purposes situated in the territory of a
Contracting Party to the Convention is liable under the Paris Convention, and which is suffered either (i)
in the territory of a Contracting Party or (ii) in or above maritime areas beyond the territorial sea of a
contracting Party and (I) on board or by a ship flying the flag of a Contracting party, or on board or by an
aircraft registered in the territory of a Contracting Party, or on or by an artificial island, installation or
structure under the jurisdiction of a Contracting Party, or by a national of a Contracting Party, excluding
damage suffered in or above the territorial sea of a State not Party to the Convention; or in and above the
EEZ of a Contracting Party or on the continental shelf of a Contracting Party in connection with the
exploitation or the exploration of the natural resources of that EEZ or continental shelf, provided that the
courts of a Contracting Party have jurisdiction pursuant to the Paris Convention).
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to or loss of life of any person and damage to or loss of property. Farmers would
have to prove actual damage to their property in order to establish liability.
X. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

While the minimum limits have been increased by the 1997 and 2004
Protocols, non-nuclear States may wish to consider whether agreeing to limitation
of liability is in their best interests. While it clearly benefits nuclear operators and
nuclear States, it is less clear that it benefits potential victims. Where those victims
are required by the respective Conventions in most cases to commence litigation in
the courts of the Operator State, the quantum and very availability of categories of
damage is restricted by the law applied by those courts; and even where it is
available, will be limited by the applicable limitations. In the case where claims are
in the billions of Euros, they would be at a clear disadvantage.
The revised Vienna Convention applies to damage wherever suffered. Nonnuclear States should consider carefully whether they join the revised Vienna
Convention. Particularly if the limitation of claims in time and amount concerns
non-nuclear States, they may wish to think carefully about joining the revised
Vienna Convention. Joining the CSC seems to provide little improvement, since it
is not in force, and, even so, still provides for jurisdiction in the Installation State.
Non-nuclear States at least may find the requirements of compliant national
legislation, such as exempting installations from terrorist attacks or grave natural
disaster of an exceptional character, objectionable.
The CSC does not require a minimum liability be established,2 67 but must
provide that the maximum amount of liability of the operator shall be governed by
the national law of the Installation State.268 It does require that the nature, form,
extent and equitable distribution of compensation for nuclear damage caused by a
nuclear incident be governed by the law of the competent court.2 6 9
If a State does join the revised Vienna Convention, it must upon ratification
or accession make a declaration under article 19 of the Protocol stating its intention
not to be bound with respect to States that are party only to the unamended Vienna
Convention, since they risk limiting their rights to compensation to the lower levels
in the unamended Vienna Convention. The omission of coverage for terrorist
attacks is a significant omission as this is an oft-cited concern by States.
A regime should clearly cover all nuclear installations; all nuclear incidents
wherever they should apply, and their effects anywhere in the world; damage to the
environment per se; should not carry exemptions, particularly for terrorist attacks;
should provide for an international tribunal; should provide for a backup fund for
providing compensation where a liability regime fails; should not limit liability to
an operator and should not provide for limits on liability amounts.
A fund which ensures compensation for damage, rather than one which
provides backup funding but still predicates compensation on rigid criteria, would
267. CSC Annex, supra note 136, art. 4.
268. Id. at art. 6.
269. Id. at art. I],
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go some distance towards providing some certainty of compensation. The HNS
Convention 2 7 provides for a fund which shall pay compensation to any person
suffering damage if such person has been unable to obtain full and adequate
compensation for the damage because no liability exists for damage under other
provisions of the Convention, as well as because the owner liable for the damage is
financially incapable of meeting the obligations under this Convention in full,
financial security has failed, or because the damage exceeds the owner's liability.
'Expenses reasonably incurred' or 'sacrifices reasonably made by the owner
27 l
voluntarily to prevent or minimize damage' are compensable under the Fund.
The Fund, for instance, specifically covers excluded cover for damage resulting
from a *natural phenomenon of an exceptional, inevitable and irresistible character'
to a specified limit. a72 Contributions to the Fund are made according to a formula
which calculates, for example, the amount of oil or gas received in a given year.273
States considering joining the Paris or Vienna Conventions should measure
the provisions against the criteria discussed, including the importance of a backup
fund; that absolute liability should govern; that limitation should be unlimited in
amount; that there should be a just time limit of liability; that all responsible parties
should bear liability; that claimants should be able to bring claims in a neutral
tribunal; that the applicable law should be that of the claimant; that there should a
broad definition of recoverable damage; and that there should be just rules on
standing, access to justice, and burden of proof and causation.

270. HNS Convention, supra note 59, art. 14.
271. Id. at art. 14(2).

272. Id. at art. 14(5)(b).
273. Id. atarts. 18, 19.

